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INDIAN LAW
RICHARD W. HUGHES*

I. INTRODUCTION
The field of Indian Law-an amalgam of statutory and decisional law that
arises out of the special and unique relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government' has been treated in the annual Survey issue only twice
before. 2 Its inclusion at all may seem odd: the field is one of federal law, as to
which state court decisions are not binding.' Given the unusual concentration of
Indian tribes and Indian land in New Mexico,' it is an area of law that, however
obscure to the average practitioner, will arise relatively often in otherwise routine6
litigation,' and on occasion will have at least potentially extraordinary impact.
Since the last Indian law Survey article, Indian law cases arising in New
Mexico have raised or decided numerous issues of far-reaching impact in the
field. Among those issues are the power of Indian tribes to tax and otherwise
7
regulate the conduct of non-Indians within Indian country; 8the power of the
state to tax transactions with Indians within Indian country; the measure of
*Partner, Rothstein, Bennett, Daly, Donatelli & Hughes, Santa Fe, N.M.
I. See, e.g., Morton v.Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974).
2. Estes, Indian Law, I I N.M.L. REV. 189 (1981); Hughes, Indian Law, 12 N.M. L. REv. 409
(1982).
3. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (1982 ed.)
4. New Mexico embraces the lands of 23 Indian tribes, including 19 Pueblo tribes, two Apache
reservations, a sizable portion of the huge Navajo Reservation (including the three "satellite" reservations of the Ramah, Alamo and Canoncito Bands of Navajos), and a few thousand acres of the
Ute Mountain Ute Reservation, which is primarily located in southwestern Colorado. Population
estimates are rough, especially because Navajo census figures do not follow state lines, but the
state's Indian population was estimated at 106,000 in 1980. A.N. GARWOOD, ALMANAC OF THE 50
STATES 252 (1986).

5. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), a simple suit to collect an open account for
groceries that became a landmark United States Supreme Court decision on Indian country jurisdiction.
6. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987) (assertion
of tribal title to more than two million acres of state, federal and privately-held lands).
7. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribes may tax the severance of triballyowned minerals by non-Indians within Indian country); see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe,
471 U.S. 195 (1985) (tribal tax statute valid notwithstanding lack of approval by Secretary of the
Interior); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (tribe may regulate nonIndian hunting within Indian country, pre-empting contrary state regulations; see Hughes, supra note
2, at 441-43).
8. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc., v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982)
(state may not collect gross receipts tax on proceeds of construction contract between Indian school
board and non-Indian contractor, where school was constructed on trust land); see Hughes, supra
note 2, at 443-58); Cotton Petroleum v. State of New Mexico, 106 N.M. 517, 745 P.2d 1170 (Ct.
App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 511 745 P.2d 1159 (1987), prob. juris. noted, 108 S. Ct. 1466
(1988) (No. 87-1327) (state may tax oil and gas production by non-Indian companies on Indian
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Pueblo Indian water rights;9 the ability of tribes to sue the United States to
recover land;" ° the ability of the United States to sue a state on behalf of an
Indian tribe for damages for trespass;" the ability of Indian allottees to recover
allotments lost involuntarily to non-Indians; 2 the question whether particular
areas constitute "Indian country," in which the special jurisdictional rules of
Indian law apply;' 3 the question whether state or tribal courts have jurisdiction
of cases involving Indian people and property;"4 the right of Indians to practice
their religion by engaging in practices otherwise in conflict with the law;' 5 the
nature of the federal trust responsibility in the management of tribal land and
resources; 6 the reach of tribal sovereign immunity; 7 the availability of remedies
land, notwithstanding similar tribal taxes). The very recent Cotton decision raises potentially farreaching questions, one of which, at least, will soon be decided in the United States Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 685 (1988), that severance taxes imposed by the Crow Tribe
on coal production on Crow tribal lands preempted similar taxes imposed by the state of Montana.
9. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985); see infra text
accompanying notes 245-76; see also United States v. Bluewater-Toltec Irrigation Dist., 580 F.
Supp. 1434 (D.N.M. 1984), aff'd, No. 84-1851 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1986) (federal court will defer
to state court suit for adjudication of rights to surface water even where federal suit was filed earlier
than the state suit and is not, strictly speaking, a general stream adjudication).
10. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987); see infra text
accompanying notes 21-226.
II. United States v. Univ. of N. M., 731 F.2d 703 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984)
(United States' trust responsibility over Indian land constitutes sovereign interest sufficient to overcome state's Eleventh Amendment defense to trespass suit on behalf of Indian tribe).
12. Begay v. Albers, 721 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1983) (allottee may sue in federal court for
cancellation of forged deed conveying Indian allotment to non-Indian; absent valid evidence of
allottee consent, conveyance is void and land remains in trust for allottee).
13. New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Minerals Dep't v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 820
F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Saunders, No. 86-1442 M
(D.N.M. Aug. 22, 1988); Blatchford v. Winans, No. 84-9384 HB (D.N.M., April 3, 1987), appeal
docketed, No. 87-1547 (10th Cir., April 20, 1987); Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. 333, 670
P.2d 944 (1983), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); State v. Begay, 105 N.M.
498, 734 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 731 P.2d 1352 (Ct. App. 1986).
See infra text accompanying notes 338-47.
14. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., v. Garcia, 105 N.M. 514, 734 P.2d 754 (1987); State ex rel.
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590 (1983), appeal dismissed, cert. denied,
464 U.S. 803 (1983); Lonewolf v. Lonewolf, 99 N.M. 300, 657 P.2d 627 (1982); In re Adoption
of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985). See infra
text accompanying notes 277-337.
15. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc.,
13 Ind. L. Rep. 3114 (D.N.M. April 2, 1986). See infra text accompanying notes 448-66.
16. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Co., 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984), on rehearing,
782 F.2d 855, modified, 793 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 471
(1986) (holding that government's pervasive responsibilities in overseeing leasing of Indian minerals
creates fiduciary relationship, under which Secretary is obliged to insure computation of royalty by
method most favorable to tribe, and enforce other lease terms); Pueblo de San Felipe v. Hodel, 770
F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that Secretary acted correctly in escrowing portion of right-ofway compensation attributable to area disputed by two tribes, until title issue resolved); McClanahan
v. Hodel, 14 Ind. L. Rep. 3113 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 1987) (holding that Secretary lacks authority to
approve allotment mineral lease with less than unanimous consent of owners, and that Secretary's
handling of lease negotiations in this case constituted breach of fiduciary duties to allottees).
17. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1982) (holding tribe immune from suit over construction contract; limited waiver of immunity strictly
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against tribes under the Indian Civil Rights Act;' 8 and the applicability of general
federal laws to Indian tribes.' 9 Other cases have dealt with a variety of other
Indian law issues.2" To cover such a broad range of material adequately would
require an article of inordinate length. This article thus will review key decisions
coming within four major categories: land, water, jurisdiction, and religion.
II. INDIAN LAND CASES: THE LONG SHADOW OF THE ICCA
A. Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico
Unquestionably, one of the most remarkable judicial pronouncements in the
modem era of Indian land claims can be found in the recent Tenth Circuit opinion
in Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico.2" The case was conceived on a grand scale, and
it is tempting to conclude that it collapsed under its own weight, but the court
of appeals went to extra lengths in disposing of the suit, and its novel holdings
will very likely play hob with the most unassuming Indian claims hereafter.
1. Background of the Litigation
Navajo Tribe was a suit that the Tribe brought in late 1982 against the state
of New Mexico, the United States, and various individuals, mining companies,
and others.22 The Tribe contended that two executive orders23 that added to the
construed); United Nuclear Corp. v. Clark, 584 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding Navajo Tribe
immune from suit to compel extension of plaintiff's uranium lease, and rejecting "commercial
activity" exception to such immunity); Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845
(1988) (holding Pueblo's sovereign immunity inapplicable to cause of action arising off reservation).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976); White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding tribe immune from suit and plaintiff without federal remedy under ICRA, at least where
plaintiff makes no effort to avail self of tribal remedy); Dunigan Enters., Inc., v. Pueblo of Santo
Domingo, No. 84-348 (D.N.M. July 26, 1985) (holding that Pueblo's sovereign immunity precludes
ICRA suit over disputed land, especially where plaintiff was offered, but rejected, tribal remedy).
19. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding Federal
Occupational Health and Safety Act inapplicable to Navajo tribal enterprise in light of treaty provisions).
20. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985)
(holding, probably wrongly, that Congress intended by § 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act, ch. 331, 43
Stat. 636, to confer on pueblos unqualified power to enter into consensual transactions involving
conveyances of their lands); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Baca, 844 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding
that American survey of Spanish grant not conclusive in land dispute between private parties, both
of whose titles derive from Spanish period, where better evidence is available to establish original
boundaries of grant); Navajo Tribe v. Bank of N.M., 700 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that
Navajo Housing and Development Enterprise is not so closely integrated with Navajo tribal government that tribe's assets can be offset against NHDE's debts); Pueblo of Acoma v. AT&SF Ry.
Co., No. 82-1550 (D.N.M. Dec. 18, 1986) (holding Pueblo barred from challenging Secretary's
purported ratification, under § 17 of Pueblo Lands Act, of invalid deeds to railroad); Pueblo of
Acoma v. New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co., No. 82-1551 JB (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 1986) (holding
Pueblo barred by judgment in Indian Claims Commission Act case from claiming, on basis of
aboriginal title, minerals granted to railroad; see infra text accompanying notes 207-24.
21. 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987). The district court opinion, which the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
is unreported. The Tribe did not seek Supreme Court review.
22. Id. at 1462.
23. Exec. Order No. 709 (1907), reprinted in 6 H.R. Rep. No. 1663, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1908); Exec. Order No. 744, reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 1663, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1908).
The area added by E.O. 709 reached from the existing reservation boundary eastward to the Jicarilla
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Navajo Reservation a vast area of northwestern New Mexico had never been
validly revoked, and that the Tribe still held beneficial title to the entire area
added by the orders.' An understanding of the claim, and of the reach of the
Tenth Circuit decision, requires a brief historical digression.
The Navajo Indians first migrated from the far north into what is now northwestern New Mexico perhaps as early as the 16th century, 5 and for centuries
inhabited the region extending from the lands of the Rio Grande Pueblos westward
into what is now Arizona. The Navajos were a constant threat to the Pueblos
and to non-Indian settlements in New Mexico, raiding and menacing ranches
and towns until open hostilities broke out with the American military in the mid1800's. In the early 1860's Brig. Gen. James H. Carleton, with the able assistance
of the famous Taoseno scout, Kit Carson, forcibly rounded up all the Navajos
he could find--eventually some 8,000 in all-and in 1864 herded them on the
infamous "Long Walk" to the Bosque Redondo, a small, dry, inhospitable reservation on the Pecos River at Ft. Sumner, New Mexico. This bitter exile nearly
finished the Na\ajo; those who had survived the Long Walk faced near-starvation,
disease, and thq fierce extremes of weather common on New Mexico's eastern
plains. After thee years many had died, and their once-vast sheep herds were
totally lost.2 EvIen the government found the Navajos' condition intolerable, and
in 1868 negotiated a treaty by which the Navajos agreed to resettle on a new
reservation that included much of their old homeland in northwestern New Mexico and northeatern Arizona.27
It is likely thht, having been told they could return home, the Ft. Sumner
Navajos simply 1went back to exactly where they had been before the Long
Walk.2" Unfortunately, much of the original Navajo homeland was east and south
of the treaty reservation-the region of arid mesas and canyons stretching from
Mt. Taylor northward to southern Colorado. Many of the returnees evidently
resettled there, on lands to which they no longer had any legal right, and where,
for the next thirty years, they were basically ignored by the Indian Service. In
the early 1900's, their poverty and desperation finally became a matter of concern
to the government. 29 The discovery of artesian water supplies was attracting nonApache Reservation, and south almost to the AT&SF Railroad line. It nearly doubled the area of
the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico. The second order made a correction in the description of
the area added by the first, so as to delete two townships that were already part of the Jicarilla
Apache Reservation.
24. Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d at 1462.
25. Or earlier. See, e.g., L.C. KELLY, THE NAVAJO INDIANS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY !(1968);
F. McNrrr, NAVAJO WARS 3-5 (1972); R. UNDERHILL, THE NAVAJOS 14-22 (1967). The Indian
Claims Commission found that the Navajos entered the Southwest "sometime between 1300 A.D.
and 1500 A.D." Navajo Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 244, 246 (1970).
26. L.R. BAILEY, THE LONG WALK 173-233 (1964).
27. Treaty Between the United States and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, June I, 1868, art. 2, 15
Stat. 667. The treaty reservation, rectangular in shape, was about 60 miles wide, its center line the
boundary between Arizona and New Mexico, and about 90 miles long, extending from the north
boundary of Arizona and New Mexico southward to just north of what is now Window Rock,
Arizona. The treaty has been held to have constituted a cession of the tribe's aboriginal title lands.
Navajo Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 248.
28. See L. KELLY, supra note 25, at 17-25; R. UNDERHILL, supra note 25, at 144-54.
29. L. KELLY, supra note 25, at 23.
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Indian ranchers to this area for the first time, and the squatter Navajo population
was coming under severe pressure. Officials of the Indian Service conceived a
plan whereby a large area, encompassing the entire Eastern Navajo population,
would be withdrawn by executive order, after which the Navajos living there
would be issued individual 160-acre Indian allotments under the General Allotment Act of 1887.' Once that process was complete, the excess land would be
restored to the public domain.' In late 1907, the plan was set in motion with
the issuance of Executive Order (E.O.) Number 709, which added about 3,000
square miles to the reservation.32
As the Tenth Circuit observed in Navajo Tribe, "[tihe ink was barely dry" on
E.O. 709 when concern arose among New Mexico ranchers and politicians over
this huge addition to Navajo land holdings.33 Hoping to speed the restoration of
surplus lands to the public domain, Congress quickly added a provision to an
omnibus Indian affairs bill that provided,
That whenever the President is satisfied that all the Indians in any part of
the Navajo Indian Reservation in New Mexico and Arizona created by
Executive Orders of November ninth, nineteen hundred and seven, and
January twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and eight, have been allotted, the
surplus lands in such part of the reservation shall be restored to the public
domain and opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President.
The Indian Service hurriedly sent allotment agents to start collecting allotment
applications from the Eastern Navajos, but political pressure from ranchers unwilling to let the process run its course grew even more intense. The President
buckled. Just over a year after he had made the withdrawal, on December 30,
1908, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order Number 1000, restoring to
the public domain the unallotted lands in the eastern half of the withdrawn area.3"
The balance of the withdrawn lands in New Mexico was restored by Executive
Order Number 1284, signed by President Taft in 1911. 36 According to the Tribe's
30. As amended, 25 U.S.C. §§331-58 (1982). The Act was Congress' first attempt to effect a
general solution to what Congress viewed as the Indian "problem." Under it, tribal members on
reservations designated by the President would each select parcels of 160 acres (quarter-sections),
to which they would receive individual trust patents. The rest of the reservation would be opened
for sale to and settlement by non-Indians. The good examples set by their new white neighbors,
some thought, would inspire the Indians to become yeoman farmers. See generally, D. Ons, THE
DAWES AcT AND THE ALLoTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (F. Prucha ed., 1973). The Navajo case is unusual
in that the Act was used as a way of enlarging, rather than diminishing and disrupting, the Indian
land base. The Navajo Reservation proper was never opened to allotment.
31. L. KELLY, supra note 25, at 23-24.
32. See supra note 23.
33. 809 F.2d at 1458.
34. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 25, 35 Stat. 444,457. By this enactment, Congress apparently
intended that restorations be made piecemeal, so that as soon as all Navajos in any area had been
allotted, the surplus lands in that area would be restored without waiting for the process to be
completed throughout the entire addition. L. KELLY, supra note 25, at 24.
35. Exec. Order No. 1000, December 30, 1908.
36. Exec. Order No. 1284, January 16, 1911. Neither order restored to the public domain lands
in Arizona that had also been added to the Navajo Reservation by E.O. 709, and those lands continue
to be recognized as part of the Navajo Reservation.
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complaint in Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, fewer than half of the Navajos in the
withdrawn area had been allotted when the restorations were made.3
The theory of the Tribe's complaint in Navajo Tribe, in essence, was that
Congress had conditioned restoration of the unallotted lands to the public domain
on the issuance of allotments to all eligible Navajos. That condition, the Tribe
claimed, had not been fulfilled when Executive Orders 1000 and 1284 issued,
and those Orders were thus unlawful. The land remained part of the Navajo
Reservation and beneficially owned by the Navajo Tribe, the complaint alleged,
and the patents and leases for lands within the E.O. 709 area issued by the
United States to the state and hundreds of non-Indians were void. 8
All the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on a variety of grounds.
The district court granted the motions in early 1984, primarily on the grounds
that the claim against the United States should have been brought under the
Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA),39 and was now barred, and that the
claims against the other parties could not go forward in the United States'
absence.' The Tenth Circuit affirmed, on both points.
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Judge McKay's opinion for the unanimous Tenth Circuit panel began by
tackling head-on the Tribe's contention that the ICCA was not intended to encompass claims of unextinguished Indian title. 4 ' The court's analysis was straightforward. The court reviewed the language and legislative history of the ICCA,
and concluded that Congress had intended the jurisdiction of the Indian Claims
Commission under Section 2 of the Act to have the broadest possible sweep.42
"Claims" under the Act, the court held, included not only claims for damages
for lands taken, but also "claims" of unextinguished title to land. Claims such
37. 809 F.2d at 1459 & n.9. The allotment process nonetheless continued thereafter. At the same
time, however, homestead entries, railroad grant lands and, later, patents to the state, became
thoroughly intermingled with the federal and Indian lands throughout this area, leading it to earn
the term by which it is familiarly known today, "the Checkerboard Area." From the Indian law
perspective, the area has become something of a jurisdictional quagmire. See Hughes, supra note
2, at 410-41.
38. 809 F.2d at 1462. More than mere land was at stake. The area has been found to contain
immense reserves of low-sulfur coal, minable by surface methods; and its vast oil, gas and uranium
deposits have been known, and mined, for the past half-century. The tribe claimed an unspecified
sum in damages for trespass, and mesne profits and restitution of all rents and profits derived from
the land. Complaint at 13.
39. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 70-70v-2 (1976); omitted from current United States Code because Commission existence terminated on Sept. 30, 1978).
40. Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, No. 82-1148 JB (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d
1455 (10th Cir. 1987).
41. 809 F.2d at 1464-71. The Tribe raised a preliminary issue, whether the district court had
properly relied upon two Eighth Circuit opinions, Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d
140 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982), and Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake
Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1983). The Tenth Circuit determined that it need not decide
that question, however, as it felt that grounds wholly independent of the Oglala rationales justified
affirmance of the decision below.
42. 809 F.2d at 1465-66, 1471.

Winter 1988]

INDIAN LAW

as the Navajo Tribe's claim here, the court held, should have been filed under
the ICCA, and otherwise were barred. 43 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit said, in a
ruling that is utterly without precedent, if the Indian Claims Commission (ICC)
had found that the Tribe did indeed have a valid claim of title, it would simply
have awarded the tribe "just monetary compensation" for the land, rather than
the land itself, so as not to disrupt the titles of non-Indians." Alternatively, the
court held, 45 the Tribe's suit to quiet its title against the United States was timebarred by the twelve-year limitation period of the Quiet Title Act."
The court further affirmed the district court's dismissal as to the non-federal
parties, holding that a determination that a case should be dismissed due to the
indispensability of an absent and unjoinable party (here, the United States) is
reversible only for abuse of discretion.47 The court set out the district court's
holding on this issue verbatim, then conducted its own "brief review" of the
factors governing indispensability" and reached the same conclusion as the
district court. The Tenth Circuit dismissed as "inapposite" contrary precedent
cited by the Tribe.49
Finally, the court dispensed with the Tribe's arguments founded on Solem v.
Bartlett,5" a case decided after the district court's decision. That case, the court
said, would be relevant, if at all, only to the jurisdictional question whether
E.O. 1000 and E.O. 1268 annulled the extension of the reservation boundaries
effected by E.O. 709. It would not bear at all on the issue of title to the lands
within those boundaries. 5' The court viewed the Tribe's complaint as not having
raised the jurisdictional issue, and added, in a footnote, "we would not be
surprised if the status of the Executive Order reservation at issue here is litigated
someday in an analogous context [to that in Solem]."52
While it remains to be seen just how far the Tenth Circuit will extend these
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1467.
45. Id. at 1468-69.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (1982). The Tribe had pleaded the action as one in ejectment, but on
appeal repeatedly characterized it as a suit to quiet title. Because the complaint had not alleged
clearly that the Tribe was in present possession of the land, the Tenth Circuit doubted that an action
to quiet title would lie. 809 F.2d at 1462 n. 15. But see infra note 54.
47. 809 F.2d at 1471.
48. Id. at 1472-73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
49. 809 F.2d at 1473. See infra text accompanying notes 166-82.
50. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). The case arose from a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the
conviction in a South Dakota state court of a Cheyenne River Sioux Indian for rape of another tribal
member. The crime occurred in Eagle Butte, a town within the portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation that had been opened to allotment and white settlement. The Supreme Court held that
despite the opening legislation, the opened portion remained part of the Reservation, and that the
state court thus lacked jurisdiction over the crime. See infra text accompanying notes 395-403.
51. 809 F.2d at 1474-76.
52. Id. at 1475 n.30. As it happens, exactly such a case already has reached the Tenth Circuit.
See Blatchford v. Winans, No. 84-0384 HB (D.N.M. April 3, 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1547
(10th Cir. Apr. 20, 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 363-423. In another case decided just
before publication of this article, moreover, the New Mexico federal district court held that the E.O.
709 reservation has not been diminished. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Saunders, No.
86-1442 M (D.N.M. Aug. 22, 1988). See infra note 405.
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holdings in future cases, the potential impact of this case on Indian land claims
in New Mexico is undoubtedly substantial. That the ICCA provided the exclusive
means for adjudication of pre-1946 tribal claims for money damages against the
United States has never been doubted, but nothing in the Act suggests it was
meant to handle live title disputes. And to say, as the Tenth Circuit did in Navajo
Tribe, not only that such title claims had to be filed under the ICCA, but also
that Congress intended that those proven valid were to be liquidated, is unsupported by anything in the language of the Act or the entire mass of litigation
under the Act.53 It may be that the court was correct that there is no jurisdiction
for the Navajo claim against the United States asserting title to the federally held
lands within the E.O. 709 reservation, 54 but an analysis of the ICCA and the
53. Approximately 370 petitions were filed under the ICCA. The decisions of the Indian Claims
Commission on those cases fill 43 volumes of the Indian Claims Commission Reports, totalling
more than 22,000 pages. Many appeals were taken to the United States Court of Claims under § 20
of the Act (formerly 25 U.S.C. §70s), and a few reached the Supreme Court. In 1978, when
Congress terminated the Commission's existence, Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. 94-465, 90 Stat.
1990, the 102 remaining cases were transferred to the Court of Claims (since renamed the United
States Claims Court; see Act of April 2, 1982, Pub. L. 97-164, Title 1, 96 Stat. 34), where several
are still pending.
54. Or more precisely, that the claim is barred. In particular, the court's holding as to the bar of
the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982), seems entirely sound, and that is the only avenue
Congress has opened for suits claiming title to land as against the government. Virtually all Indian
claims of unextinguished title arose (by federal interference with the tribe's right of use and occupancy) long ago, and they thus would be barred by the 12-year limitations period of that Act. 28
U.S.C. § 2409a(g). The Act does not apply to claims to "trust or restricted Indian lands," § 2409a(a),
but as the Tenth Circuit noted, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Mottaz, 106 S.Ct. 2224
(1986) that that provision only precludes suits by non-Indians seeking to try title to lands held in
trust for Indians; it does not exempt from the Act Indian claims to land under exclusive federal
control. 809 F.2d at 1469.
In Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983), also discussed by the Tenth Circuit, 809 F.2d
at 1468-69, the Supreme Court held that Congress' enactment of the Quiet Title Act precluded any
implication of any other means by which to try title against the United States, as, for example, by
a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982). (Similarly, in Motaz
the Court rejected the contention that 25 U.S.C. § 345 (1982), a provision of the General Allotment
Act that waives the government's immunity for suits to compel the issuance of Indian allotments,
could be used to contest the government's title to an allotment purportedly purchased from the
allottees by the Forest Service.) A title suit barred by the limitation provision of the Quiet Title Act,
thus, may simply not be brought against the government. Cf. Dunigan Enters., Inc., v. Pueblo of
Santo Domingo, No. 84-348 (D.N.M. July 26, 1985) (no APA claim available against Secretary of
the Interior to challenge tribe's title to disputed land, where plaintiff's Quiet Title Act claim is barred
by statute of limitations).
The Tenth Circuit exhibited some uneasiness with whether the Navajo suit was one in ejectment
or to quiet title. See, 809 F.2d at 1462 n. 15, 1468 (text at n. 20). At common law, an allegation of
possession by the plaintiff was an essential requirement of the equitable action to quiet title. See,
e.g., Wood v. Phillips, 50 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1931). The distinction is important in private litigation,
since a defendant in possession may insist that the action be deemed one in ejectment, and demand
a jury. No jury is available under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f), but it is highly doubtful
that Congress intended jurisdiction under the Act to turn on the often highly technical issue of
possession. The language of the Act is broad, providing jurisdiction (and a corresponding waiver
of the government's immunity) for any civil action "to adjudicate disputed title to real property in
which the United States claims an interest." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). There appear to be no reported
decisions in which actions under the Act were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
the plaintiff failed to allege or establish possession of the disputed property. In short, the technical
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hundreds of decisions under it, and a review of other Indian land cases of the
past twenty years, yields little support for the court's primary basis for that
conclusion.
3. The Opinion Analyzed-The ICCA and the Yankton Sioux Case
Enacted in 1946, the Indian Claims Commission Act undoubtedly was intended, as the Tenth Circuit said, 55 to put an end to Indian claims litigation, by
affording all tribes an opportunity to bring all their old claims for alleged wrongs
by the United States before the Indian Claims Commission. For long prior to
the ICCA's enactment, Congress had been deluged with requests by tribes for
special jurisdictional acts to enable them to litigate such claims. 6 The ICCA,
Congress hoped, would obviate the need for future such acts, and, as the Supreme
Court said in United States v. Dann, "dispose of the Indian Claims problem with
finality. "57
Congress' ability, in 1946, to design an act that would indeed conclude all
old Indian claims, however, was necessarily limited by what Congress knew of
such claims, based on the claims Congress had considered in the context of
special jurisdictional acts, and the testimony of Indian claims attorneys regarding
the kinds of claims yet to be brought. For whatever reasons, up to that time (and
for several years thereafter), the idea that Indian tribes still had claims of unextinguished title to lands not under their control was not one that had many
adherents in the Indian claims bar. Indian claims pertaining to land routinely,
and almost invariably, sought money damages for takings of land. That is not
rules of pleading applicable to actions to try title at common law ought to be regarded as irrelevant
to suits under the Quiet Title Act. That statute should be seen as providing the exclusive means of
suing the United States to determine title, regardless of who has possession of the land.
One may wonder why, when it had this very clear and uncontroversial ground for disposing of
the Navajo claim against the United States, the Tenth Circuit did not rest its holding entirely on the
Quiet Title Act, instead of treating that ground as an alternative to its wholly novel and frankly
dubious interpretation of the ICCA.
55. 809 F.2d at 1460-61, 1464-66.
56. In 1863, in an act amending in various respects the jurisdiction and structure of the Court of
Claims, Congress excluded from that court's purview claims by Indian tribes based on treaties. Act
of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767. Attorneys for tribes began approaching Congress
for special acts to permit individual treaty claims to be brought. Over time, the practice became so
ingrained that special jurisdictional acts were sought for all manner of tribal claims, including many
non-treaty-based claims that probably could have been brought under the Tucker Act, Act of March
3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, the source of the modem jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Hundreds
of such special acts were passed. Most of them were compiled by Felix Cohen in the original edition

of his monumental
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373-78 (1942). In addition to creating a

forum for pre-1946 Indian Claims, the ICCA also, at § 24 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982)), permanently assured tribes of the right to sue the United States in the Claims Court for Tucker Acttype claims arising thereafter. The "treaty claim" exclusion was finally repealed by the Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 139, §88, 63 Stat. 89, 102. See Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl.
1970).
57. 470 U.S. 39, 45 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1945)).
The line was quoted by the Tenth Circuit in Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1464. To be sure, Congress'
hope in this regard has not been entirely realized. On occasion, Congress still has to deal with old
Indian claims. See, e.g., Act of May 15, 1978, Pub.L. 95-280, 92 Stat. 244 (conferring jurisdiction
on the Court of Claims to hear claims by the Zuni Pueblo for ancient wrongs).
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to say that the Indians did not want their land back; they almost always did, but
that was not a choice presented to them by their claims counsel. Most Indian
land, moreover, had indeed been "taken" by express governmental action, 8
usually treaties or agreements whereby tribes ceded their lands to the United
States, and occasionally by a unilateral act of Congress (as in the infamous Black
Hills case, where Congress "ratified" a treaty of cession that it knew did not
have the assent of the Sioux59 ). Even had Congress been aware of the existence
of outstanding or potential tribal claims of unextinguished title to lands, moreover, it would be remarkable for Congress to have decided that all such claims
were to be forcibly liquidated under the Act, and there is no hard evidence that
it did so.
That point, as the Tenth Circuit recognized,' is crucial to the holding in
Navajo Tribe, and the court thus tried to demonstrate that Congress did intend
the ICCA to dispose of tribal claims of unextinguished title to land in that way.
The only example the Tenth Circuit could unearth purportedly showing that
Congress had previously considered such claims was Yankton Sioux Tribe v.
United States," a case that preceded the ICCA by twenty years. In a real sense,
the correctness of the Navajo Tribe court's novel interpretation of the ICCA
hinges on that obscure 1926 decision.
The Tenth Circuit characterized Yankton Sioux as a case in which the Tribe
pleaded and proved present title to its ancient Red Pipestone Quarry, but rather
than return the land to the Tribe the Supreme Court held that the Tribe was
"entitled to just compensation as for a taking under the power of eminent domain.
In the Tenth Circuit's view, Yankton Sioux illustrated exactly what
Congress intended would happen under the ICCA to claims like that of the
Navajo Tribe.63 Closer analysis of the Yankton Sioux claim for the pipestone
quarry, however, undermines the Tenth Circuit's proposition.
In 1858, the Yankton Sioux entered into a treaty' by which they ceded to the
United States all of their lands except for a tract of 400,000 acres on the Missouri
River. Article VIII of the treaty preserved for the Tribe "the free and unrestricted65
use" of its Red Pipestone Quarry, "for the purpose of securing stone for pipes."
A survey was done of the quarry area, which totalled 648.2 acres, but the
58. The principle that Indian land can be taken (i.e., that a tribe can lose its title voluntarily or
otherwise) only by an express and deliberate act of the sovereign is rooted in international law
doctrines that long predate American independence. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823). Cohen, supra note 3, at 50-58. One of the earliest pieces of legislation enacted under the
American Constitution, the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, I
Stat. 138, included a codification of this elemental doctrine at §4, and it has been part of the positive
law of the nation ever since. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982) (often called the "Nonintercourse Act").
The Supreme Court has emphasized the strict standard applied to determining whether Congress
intended a particular act to extinguish Indian title. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians
v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
59. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-84 (1980).
60. 809 F.2d at 1466.
61. 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
62. Id. at 359; 809 F.2d at 1467.
63. 809 F.2d at 1466-67.
64. Treaty Between the United States and the Yancton [sic] Tribe of Sioux, or Dacotah Indians,
February 16, 1859, II Stat. 743.
65. Id., art. VIII.
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government's actions over the next thirty years with respect to that tract showed
marked inconsistency on the question of the Tribe's rights therein. 6 In 1892,
the government negotiated a second agreement with the Tribe 67 to obtain a cession
of another 150,000 acres of tribal land. At the Indians' insistence that agreement
included article XVI, which said, in essence, that if the Secretary of the Interior
did not, within one year after Congress ratified the agreement, refer to the United
States Supreme Court for decision the question of ownership of the quarry, the
United States would be deemed to have waived all its claims of ownership,68and
the quarry would thereafter be "solely the property of the Yankton tribe."
The Secretary, deeming it impracticable to comply with that condition, made
no such referral. In 1897, Congress authorized the Secretary to negotiate the
purchase of the quarry land (on which an Indian school had been built) from the
Tribe. A price of $100,000 was agreed on in 1899, but Congress refused to ratify
the purchase.69 Then the claims lawyers stepped in.
In 1910, Congress enacted a special jurisdictional act enabling the Court of
Claims to "report a finding of fact . . . as to the interest, title, ownership, and
right of possession" of the Tribe in the quarry land.70 The court's decision in
the case brought by the Tribe pursuant to that act set out the factual history of
title to the quarry, but deeming the ultimate question of title to be a matter of
law, rather than of "fact", the court regarded itself as precluded by the jurisdictional act from making a determination of title. 7' Another special act, passed
in 1925,72 led to the litigation that the Tenth Circuit viewed as pivotal to its view
of the ICCA in Navajo Tribe.
The Navajo Tribe court characterized the Tribe's claim in Yankton Sioux as
one seeking "clarification of [the tribe's] asserted title to lands-not compensation for a taking of lands." 73 In support of its premise the court quoted a
passage from the jurisdictional act, showing that the object of the suit was a
declaration of the character of the Tribe's title.7' The act that the Tenth Circuit
quoted, however, was the 1910 act, not the 1925 act. As noted, the 1910 act
only authorized the Court of Claims to make factual findings.75 The 1925 act,
however, authorized that court to determine titles on the basis of the facts found
66. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 67, 78-80 (1917). In United States v.
Carpenter, 111 U.S. 347 (1884), the Supreme Court held that a patent issued under the public land
laws for an entry within the quarry area should be cancelled, because the reservation of that area
by the treaty put those lands beyond the Land Department's power to dispose of.
67. Agreement With the Yankton Sioux or Dakota Indians, December 31, 1892, 28 Stat. 286,
314-19 (1894).
68. 28 Stat. 317-18.
69. Yankton Sioux, 53 Ct. Cl. at 80-81.
70. Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, §22, 36 Stat. 269, 284.
71. Yankton Sioux, 53 Ct. Cl. at 81.
72. Act of January 9, 1925, ch. 59, 43 Stat. 730. Actually, the Yankton Sioux had filed their
petition in the Court of Claims under an earlier, more general Act, allowing the filing of "all claims
of whatsoever nature which the Sioux Tribe of Indians may have against the United States." Act of
June 3, 1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738. The court regarded the 1925 Act as definitely establishing its
jurisdiction over the quarry claim. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 40, 55 (1925),
rev'd on other grounds, 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
73. 809 F.2d at 1466.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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in the prior litigation, and to determine "what amount, if any, is legally and
equitably due from the United States to the said Yankton Band of Santee Sioux
Indians for the said quarries, and enter judgment thereon." 7 6
The course of the Yankton Sioux litigation is even more revealing. The Court
of Claims found that the 1858 treaty had recognized not Indian title to the quarry,
but a use right or easement, with which the government had never interfered
and which it had never extinguished. The court rejected the Tribe's argument
that because the Secretary never referred the title question to the Supreme Court
as required by the 1892 agreement, the United States had waived its claim of
title to the quarry. The court viewed the referral as an impossible condition,
because the Supreme Court could not consider such questions absent a real case
or controversy," and it thus refused to enforce the waiver provision."8 Because
the court regarded the Tribe's rights as use rights only, that were fully intact, it
held that the Tribe was entitled to no compensation, and it dismissed the petition.7 9
The Tribe sought review in the Supreme Court, without opposition from the
government. Its statement of its position was clear and to the point:
Petitioners do not claim the present value of their right in the Pipestone
Reservation, nor do they resort to the legal remedy of an action in ejectment
to recover the exclusive possession of the property. Their sole desire is to
obtainjust compensationfor that which was taken from them for public use

to which under the Constitution of the United States they are entitled.'
Thus, the Tribe's unmistakable object was not to establish its rights to the
quarry-which the Court of Claims held were intact-but to obtain compensation
for their taking.
The Tenth Circuit, in Navajo Tribe, said that the Supreme Court in Yankton
Sioux had found that the Tribe owned the quarry lands "'in fee,'' but that to
avoid interference with the titles of numerous persons who had since settled on
the land the Supreme Court directed payment to the Tribe "'of just compensation
as for a taking under the power of eminent domain.'"82 The Tenth Circuit again
seems to be mistaken about the facts in this concededly confusing case. The
Tribe had argued that if article XVI of the 1892 agreement (waiving the United
States' title if no referral were made to the Supreme Court) was not enforced,
the entire treaty should be declared void, because resolution of the question of
title to the quarry had been an essential element of the consideration for the
Tribe's cession of land in that treaty. The Supreme Court agreed. 8" It was the
titles of purchasers of the ceded 150,000 acres about which the Court was thus
concerned; the only occupant of the quarry land was the government Indian
76. Act of January 9, 1925, ch. 59, 43 Stat. 738.
77. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
78. Yankton Sioux, 61 Ct. CI. at 56.
79. Id. at 57.
80. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926), Petitioner's Brief in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26-27 (emphasis added). Essentially the same statement appears in
the Tribe's brief-in-chief. See Brief for Petitioners at 14, 66, 70-71.
81. 809 F.2d at 1466 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 359).
82. 809 F.2d at 1467 (quoting Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 359) (emphasis by the court).
83. Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 357.
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school." The Court held that the condition article XVI imposed on the Secretary
was not void for impossibility, that the Secretary's failure to perform vested full
fee title in the Tribe, and that, as the Tribe urged, the United States had taken
the land.85 When seen in context, further, the Court's specification of damages
"as for a taking under the power of eminent domain,"" did not mean, as the
Tenth Circuit seemed to think, that the Supreme Court was awarding payment
even though there was no taking. The taking was conceded by all. 87 Rather, the
passage is a response to the Tribe's argument that the damages for the taking
should be the $100,000.00 for which the Tribe had agreed to sell the land in
1899 8 -- essentially a contract theory, one the Court would not buy.
In short, Yankton Sioux appears not to be the case for which Judge McKay
was looking: one that shows that the government was in the business of liquidating
Indian claims of extant title to land, over tribal objection. Rather, Yankton Sioux
looks more like the all too common variety of Indian claims, in which the Tribe
(probably on the advice of counsel) claimed that its lands were taken, and sought
damages, even though, in all likelihood, no taking had in fact occurred. 89 In
such situations, of course, the government normally is disposed to agree that
there was a taking, and pay the Tribe, rather than have lingering tribal claims
to cloud titles.'
That the Tenth Circuit's premise-the proposition Yankton Sioux was supposed
to prove-is erroneous, is further suggested by another case decided ten years
after Yankton Sioux. Shoshone Tribe v. United States,9 was yet another Indian
claim brought pursuant to a special jurisdictional act.' The Tribe contended that
the jurisdictional act itself had effected a taking of its lands.93 In his opinion for
the Court, Justice Cardozo stated that such a view was "to mistake utterly the
design and meaning of the statute," explaining that
the claimant is not subject to a duty either under that act or any other to sue
the Government at all. In the event of a failure to sue or to prosecute the
suit to a decree, rights and liabilities will remain as they were before any
84. Id.
85. Id. at 358-59. Just how the taking had occurred, admittedly, was not discussed, but both
parties agreed that there had been a taking, so the Court had no reason to rule otherwise.
86. Id. at 359.
87. Id. ("That the United States has taken and holds possession of the entire Quarry tract of 648
acres is not in dispute; ...").
88. Brief of Petitioner at 70-73.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 96-114.
90. See infra note 94. But see Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). There,
the tribe claimed damages for the taking of its treaty hunting and fishing rights by a 1954 statute
terminating the federal trust relationship with the tribe. Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954,
ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973) (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C §§ 891-902 (1970)). The
Court agreed with the United States that termination had left the tribe's hunting and fishing rights
unaffected, and, thus, no compensation was due.
91. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
92. Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 302, 44 Stat. 1349.
93. Shoshone Tribe, 299 U.S. at 492. Since such Acts were passed only at the urging of the
tribes and their claims attorneys, this argument seems astonishing. It was motivated, plainly, by the
claims attorneys' wish to set the "taking date" as late as possible, so as to maximize the valuation
of the land "taken."
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act was passed. The sovereign power is not exercised to extinguish titles or
other interests against the will of tribal occupants by force of eminent domain.'

The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the ICCA in Navajo Tribe flies directly in
the face of Shoshone Tribe's general statement of the government's policy toward
Indian land claims.
4. Land Cases Under the ICCA
The Tenth Circuit's theory of the intended impact of the ICCA on claims of
unextinguished Indian title should not, however, be tested solely by cases brought
and decided decades before the ICCA was enacted. So important a proposition
ought to be evidenced somewhere in the Act itself, or in the cases decided under
it.

The language of the Act, however, is of no help to the Tenth Circuit, apart
from the admittedly broad categories of claims allowed under it. Liquidating
valid, existing titles poses special problems: for example, as of what date are
the titles valued? Does the extinguishment of title affect only lands held by the
United States, or also those patented to third parties? What title records are filed
to clear the tribal claim? Does possession matter, or can a tribe liquidate its
claim to its entire reservation?95 The utter silence of the Act on any of these
problems (not to mention the absence of any reference to the fundamental prop94. Id. at 492-93. The tribe sought damages for the taking of a half-interest in its Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming, by the government's settlement thereon, in 1878, of the Northern Arapahoes
(a traditional enemy of the Shoshone). The Court held that the taking occurred at the time of the
settlement, but that the Tribe was entitled to interest from that date.
Shoshone Tribe exemplifies the principle, established in non-Indian cases such as United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), and United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884),
that a party whose property rights have been invaded by the government normally will be accorded
the right to waive its claim to an extant title, and, "electing to regard the action of the government
as a taking under its sovereign right of eminent domain," Great Falls, 112 U.S. at 656, sue in the
Claims Court for just compensation. The government ordinarily will not dispute the claimant's choice
of remedy (although in some instances, as in Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404
(1968), see supra note 90, where the United States has done nothing whatever to impair the property
right at issue, the fact of a taking itself may be contested). If a taking is claimed, the only issue
will be when the government action reached such a point that the taking could be considered
accomplished. If the claimant asserts title, only then will the court consider whether a lawful taking
occurred. This is the only basis on which the cases cited and discussed infra at notes 96-114 and
accompanying text can be justified.
95. The Tenth Circuit's failure to address the question whether possession is relevant to the kind
of relief a tribe would have received from the Indian Claims Commission on a claim based on
continued title is especially bothersome. The court asserts that the Navajo Tribe's entire claim to
the E.O. 709 lands simply would have been liquidated by the ICC if found valid, presumably at
present-day value. Yet, as the Tribe pointed out in its Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc at 1, Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d 1455, 55% of those lands are already in Indian
possession (either by allotment, purchase, or withdrawal for tribal use), and another 21% are
administered by the Tribe under a cooperative agreement with the government. Would the Tribe's
use and occupancy rights to these lands cease under the Tenth Circuit view? Indeed, were a tribe
to claim under the ICCA virtually any tortious interference by the United States with the tribe's land
rights, the Tenth Circuit theory seems to require that the tribe would emerge from the proceeding
with a large check, but suddenly landless. It is difficult to believe that this, or anything like it, is
what Congress had in mind.
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osition that liquidation of extant titles was intended) would be perplexing if the
Tenth Circuit's view were correct. One can readily agree with the opinion that
the Act was only intended to afford the remedy of damages. It does not, however,
follow that Congress intended to compound the old wrongs done to Indianswhich this Act was to remedy-by creating a device for inverse condemnation
of all remaining tribal land claims.
Similar doubts arise from the decisional law under the ICCA. Several claims
were brought under the Act involving tribal lands that, so far as appears from
the record, were never actually ceded by the tribe or otherwise acquired by the
United States.' The Commission and the Court of Claims' disposition of these
claims is not at all supportive of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Act.
Most of the hundreds of land cases filed under the ICCA complained that the
United States had acquired the tribe's lands (by treaty or otherwise) for inadequate
consideration. The treaty or agreement fixed the date of taking; the only task
facing the Commission was to ascertain the area taken, fix its value as of the
taking date, and arrive at the damage award. Problems arose, however, in claims
for a number of southwestern tribes whose lands had never been formally taken
by the United States.97 Were the Tenth Circuit view of what Congress intended
96. The principal decisions include United States v. Pueblo of San lldefonso, 513 F.2d 1383,
206 Ct. Cl. 64 (1975); Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d
1386, 204 Ct. Cl. 137, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); United States v. Northern Paiute Nation,
393 F.2d 786, 183 Ct. Cl. 321 (1968). Especially illustrative is the bizarre and complex Western
Shoshone litigation, in which elaborate efforts by elements of the tribe to discharge the claims
attorneys and stay the proceedings to keep the case from going to final judgment were repeatedly
rebuffed by the Commission and the Court of Claims. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, I I Ind. Cl.
Comm. 387 (1962); Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. 457
(1975), aff'd sub noa. Western Shoshone Legal Defense and Educ. Ass'n v. United States and
Western Shoshone Identifiable Group, 531 F.2d 495 (Ct.CI.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976);
Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Ind. Cl. Comm. 311 (1977); Western
Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Ind. Cl. Comm. 304 (1977), aff'd sub nom. Temoak
Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States and Western Shoshone Identifiable Group
Represented by the Temoak Bands of Western [Shoshone] Indians, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct.CI.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979) (a phase of the case in which the Temoak Bands apparently ended up
being aligned against themselves); and Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 652
F.2d 41 (Ct.CI. 1981). See also the discussion of United States v. Dann, infra notes 133-52 and
accompanying text.
Other ICCA cases in which no apparent "taking" appears in the record include: Goshute Tribe v.
United States, 31 Ind. CI. Comm. 225 (1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1398 (Ct.CI. 1975) (aboriginal title
to 6 million acres in western Utah and eastern Nevada extinguished by gradual encroachment of
settlers as of 1875); Hopi Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 277 (1970) (creation of executive
order reservation said to have extinguished aboriginal title); Papago Tribe v. United States, 19 Ind.
Cl. Comm. 394 (1968), additional findings offact, 21 Ind. Cl. Comm. 403 (1969) (aboriginal title
said to be extinguished by creation of executive order reservation); Pueblo of Acoma v. United
States, 18 Ind. Cl. Comm. 154 (1967), additional findings of fact, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 219 (1970)
(stipulated "taking" of 1.5 million acres); Southern Paiute Nation v. United States, 14 Ind. CI.
Comm. 618 (1965), (combined with Chemehuevi Tribe v. United States, 14 Ind. Cl. Comm. 651
(1956)) ("taking" of 30 million acre aboriginal area in Nevada, Utah and Arizona stipulated, though
no date or event of taking identified); Pueblo of Taos v. United States, 15 Ind. Cl. Comm. 666
(1965) (creation of national forest by president extinguished title to 130,000 acres, some of which
was not even included in the forest).
97. In 1947, Felix Cohen, who had been Associate Solicitor of the Department of the Interior

and author of the first great Indian law treatise,
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by the ICCA correct, these cases would have been easy and lucrative: the claims
attorneys would simply have asserted valid, unextinguished title, and claimed
present value of the land "as for a taking." That did not occur. Without exception,
the Commission, the Court of Claims, and the claims attorneys operated on the
explicit premise that unless a pre-1946 taking of the tribe's lands was established,
no compensation was obtainable.98 The attorneys thus resorted to, and the courts
indulged, novel theories of "takings" in utter disregard of the Supreme Court's
command that only Congress can extinguish Indian title and then only by express
and deliberate act."
For example, in Gila River Pima-MaricopaIndian Community v. United States,t o
the Commission found that the Tribe had had aboriginal title to more than 3.75
million acres in the central valley of Arizona (embracing the entirety of presentday Phoenix). The claims attorneys and the government stipulated that the title
had been extinguished, but fought vigorously over how and when that had
occurred. The Commission selected 1883, which happened to be the year President Arthur, by Executive Order, added 180,000 acres to the reservation that
Congress created for the Tribe in 1859.'0' Both parties appealed. The Court of
Claims affirmed, observing that although
there was here no formal cession by the Indians, no express indication by
Congress (or its delegate) of a purpose to extinguish at a specified time, and
no single act (or contemporaneous series of acts) of the Federal Government
which indisputably erased native ownership at one swoop," 2
the popular myth that America had been stolen from the Indians was incorrect. "The fact," he
explained, "is that except for a few tracts of land in the Southwest, practically all of the public
domain of the continental United States (excluding Alaska) has been purchased from the Indians."
Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28, 33-34 (1947)(emphasis added). After leaving
the government, Cohen went to work with a Washington law firm that was getting in on the ground
floor of ICCA litigation, and he apparently helped draft some of the initial petitions for several
tribes, including those of some New Mexico Pueblos. Cohen's awareness that those tribes had never
had their lands taken shows through in these petitions, as they allege that the tribes retained unextinguished title to all their aboriginal lands, and that the government was liable not for any taking,
but for interfering with or failing to protect the tribes' rights of use and possession. See, e.g., Pueblo
of Santo Domingo v. United States, Dkt. No. 355 (CI.Ct., filed August I1, 1951), Petition at 2-3,
6; 11-14,
20-26. Unfortunately, Cohen died suddenly in 1953, at the age of 46. Other attorneys
in his firm who handled the Pueblo cases thereafter may not have had his understanding of the status
of the Pueblo lands, for in 1969 they stipulated, perhaps without their clients' knowledge, that the
titles to all of the tribes' aboriginal lands had been extinguished by the United States. See Pueblo
of Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087, 227 Ct. Cl. 265, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006
(1981).
98. See, e.g., Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d 1386,
1394-95, 204 Ct. Cl. 137, 151-52 (1974) (Nichols, J., concurring).
99. United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353 (1941).
See Cohen, supra note 3, at 224, 488-93. See cases cited supra note 96.
100. 494 F.2d 1386, 204 Ct. Cl. 137, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). (There are numerous
other opinions on other aspects of this claim, some of which are still pending.)
101. Gila River, 27 Ind. Cl. Comm. 11 (1972), afftd, 494 F.2d 1386, 204 Ct. Cl. 137, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). Other additions were made to the reservation, both before and after
1883. 494 F.2d at 1388, 204 Ct. Cl. at 140. In Hualpai Indians, 314 U.S. at 351-54, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the creation of a reservation, even by Congress, extinguished any
aboriginal rights of the Tribe, unless Congress clearly expressed an intention to effect such an
extinguishment.
102. 494 F.2d at 1392, 204 Ct. Cl. at 147.
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the Commission "had discretion to choose the 1883 event" as the taking date.1
Concurring, Judge Nichols philosophized on the claims process and its problems,
in terms that bear quoting at some length:

I join in the opinion and judgment of the court, with the caveat that in my
view nothing happened in 1883 that could have constituted a taking of these
Indians' heritage, at least not in the traditional eminent domain sense. In a
true Fifth Amendment case such looseness in fixing a taking date would be
unacceptable, even though at times it must be a jury verdict sort of thing
Here, however, we are not talking in an eminent
as to the exact hour....
domain sense and we are dealing with an "extinguishment" of aboriginal
title rather than a true taking. The idea that the Commission has a broad
discretion to choose among a number of conceivable dates, in the situation
we have here, has the sanction of necessity. An extinguishment date we must
have. Yet the truth is, we know the Indians once had their 3,750,000 acres
and by 1946, by common understanding, had them no longer, but when
they lost them defies determination. The United States was acting, it was
at all times supposed, with undeviating benevolence. The idea of expropriation was never entertained, yet in a fit of absentmindedness the deed was
The use of average, composite, or jury verdict taking
somehow done ....
The
dates is an accepted example of the powers the Commission has ....
Commission is not a court but a body in the executive branch. The task of
righting Indian wrongs was characterized long before the 1946 Act as not
judicial but political. Under the Act the task is made to look primarily
judicial, but management rather than adjudication must occasionally be the
dominant theme. They must at times adjudicate the unjusticiable. We must
approach our tasks of judicial review with our minds wary of legalisms and
tolerant of the compromise legalism must make if these ancient wrongs are
to be settled in any of our lifetimes. Our decision herein satisfies me on
these stated grounds. "4
Had Congress really intended the ICCA as a device for inverse condemnation
of Indian lands from which the Indians had been removed, but to which their
title was intact, such rationalizations would obviously have been unnecessary,
as would the labored efforts to find takings that were, legally, impossible. Instead,

the firm and apparently correct conviction that compensation was available under
the ICCA only for land that had been actually taken, before 1946, led to a line
of decisions on "extinguishment" of Indian title that cannot be harmonized in
any respect with the relevant Supreme Court authorities. Thus, in United States
v. Northern Paiute Nation,' the parties jointly proposed, and the Commission
accepted, a "taking" date of December 31, 1862, although nothing happened
on that date (or any other, evidently) to effectuate a real taking of Northern

Paiute tribal land."o In Shoshone Tribe v. United States, the Commission found
103. Id. at 1393, 204 Ct. Cl. at 149.
104. Id. at 1394-95, 204 Ct. Cl. at 151-52 (Nichols, J., concurring) (citations omitted; emphasis
added). See also, United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786, 803-807, 183 Ct. CI. 321,
352-58, (1968) (separate views of Nichols, J.); and see Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States,
647 F.2d 1087, 1089-93, 227 Ct. CI. 265, 268-75 (Nichols, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1006 (1981).
105. 393 F.2d 786, 183 Ct. CI. 321 (1968).
106. Writing separately, Judge Nichols noted that the principal significance of the date seems to
have been that it was the point at which the highest value attached to the minerals within the
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extinguishment of tribal aboriginal title to a vast area-some 22 million acres
in all-by "gradual encroachment" of white settlers.'0 7 Later, the parties stipulated that for purposes of compensation, the lands would be valued as of July
1, 1872,"~ although no act even arguably constituting a legal taking occurred
on that date. In United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, " the parties stipulated
to extinguishment of the tribes' aboriginal title, but fought over the date. The
Court of Claims saw no merit in the dates that the government urged, and thus
accepted the dates proferred by the attorneys for the Pueblos." 0 All of those
dates were of various administrative actions. Congress had no hand in any of
them.
It must be acknowledged that these cases, and others like them,"' in a sense,
effectively accomplished exactly what the Tenth Circuit said Congress intended
to happen under the ICCA-the liquidation of what had probably been extant
tribal aboriginal title claims as against the United States. " 2 They did so, however,
only because the claims attorneys handled the claims as they did, proceeding on
the apparently unshakable belief that the land had been taken, and simply asking
for compensation. In none of these cases did any party or the court ever suggest
the obvious-that no taking had occurred, and that the tribal title was unextinguished. At the most, the cases illustrate the continued force of Justice Cardozo's
declaration in Shoshone Tribe v. United States,"' that the government is not
forcing any tribe to liquidate a title claim, but will accommodate those that
choose to do so.
In at least two of these cases, moreover, the tribes (or parts of them) strenuously
sought to change the course of the claims by getting out from under the stipulations of extinguishment. The Court of Claims rebuffed both efforts, "' but never
aboriginal area (which included the legendary Comstock Lode), and thus its selection, and the court's
ruling that the Indians were entitled to compensation for the minerals, effectively maximized the
damages award. Id. at 803-04, 183 Ct. Cl. at 352-54 (Nichols, J., separate statement). Judge Nichols
ended his separate statement with his own thoughts on how the tribe's lands had been taken,
concluding, "As to land still in the public domain, still vacant, t do not think it has been taken yet."
Id. at 807, 183 Ct. Cl. at 358.
107. 11 Ind. Cl. Comm. 387, 416 (1962). See supra note 96.
108. Western Shoshone Identifiable Group v. United States, 29 Ind. Cl. Comm. 5 (1972).
109. 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975). (The decision dealt with the consolidated claims of three
New Mexico Pueblos.)
I10. Id. at 1386-92.
1Il. See cases cited supra note 96.
112. Under § 22 of the Act (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976)), payment of the final
judgment on a claim constituted "a full discharge of the United States," and acted to "forever bar
any further claim or demand against the United States arising out of the matter involved in the
controversy." See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985).
113. 299 U.S. 476 (1936). See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
114. Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087, 227 Ct. Cl. 265, cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1006 (1981); Temoak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States and Western
Shoshone Identifiable Group Represented by the Temoak Bands of Western [Shoshone] Indians, 593
F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979); Western Shoshone Legal Defense and Educ.
Ass'n v. United States and Western Shoshone Identifiable Group, 531 F.2d 495 (Ct. CI.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976). In each case, it was the passage of time since the stipulations, and
subsequent adjudications on the basis thereof, and the desire to wind up the claims business, that
precluded reopening the title issue. Similarly, in United States v. Oneida Nation, 576 F.2d 870, 217
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on the ground that Congress intended that the titles be liquidated anyway. Neither
the Commission, the Court of Claims, nor the United States ever suggested such
a notion. Were the Tenth Circuit correct in Navajo Tribe, however, that would
have been the obvious and complete answer for tribes trying to avoid the inadvertent loss of unextinguished titles.
5
a Miccosukee Seminole sued the Indian
Similarly, in Osceola v. Kuykendall, 1"
Claims Commission itself contending that the Act that created it was unconstitutional. Osceola argued that the ICCA enabled parties claiming to represent the
Seminole Nation to seek compensation for extinguishment of Seminole aboriginal
title to lands (among others) still occupied by the plaintiff and his band of
Seminoles." 6 The three-judge court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
"plaintiff's right of possession and occupancy will not be affected" by the
judgment in the Seminole ICCA case, and that until the plaintiff could demonstrate a palpable threat to his right of occupancy by the United States he had
failed to present a concrete controversy over which the judicial power could be
exercised." 7 Plainly, the Tenth Circuit would have had a much different answer
to Osceola's complaint. These cases seem to demonstrate, thus, that the Tenth
Circuit's view of Congress' intent in the ICCA, if correct, was utterly unknown
to the courts that heard ICCA claims, or the attorneys who litigated them.
Another ICCA case, in which the court allowed the tribal plaintiff to seek
recovery of lands it claimed but that had long been under federal control, is an
even stronger refutation of the Tenth Circuit's position. In Yakima Tribe v. United
States," ' the Tribe sought compensation for four tracts of land alleged to have
been wrongfully omitted from its treaty reservation as surveyed. The Tribe's
claims were based on its interpretation of the boundaries of the reservation, as
set forth in the treaty that was negotiated by Isaac Stevens (Governor of the
Washington Territory) with the Yakimas and other tribes, at Walla Walla, Washington, in 1855." 9 In its initial consideration of the Tribe's claim, 20 the ICC
Ct. Cl. 45 (1978), the Court of Claims refused to abate the Oneida claim (that the United States
breached its duty to the Oneidas by failing to dissuade them from selling their lands to New York
State) while the Tribe pursued litigation seeking to establish that it still held good title to the lands
it had sold. The Tribe therefore dismissed its ICCA claim altogether, and went on to succeed in its
title claim. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 250 n. 25 (1985). That result
plainly would have been impossible under the Tenth Circuit's view of the ICCA.
115. No. 76-492 (D.D.C. March II, 1977) (three-judge court).
116. Osceola contended that the Miccosukee Band (which was not recognized by the United
States until 1962) held unextinguished aboriginal title to its lands. In the Camp Moultrie Treaty, 7
Sept. 18, 1823, United States-Florida Tribes of Indians, 7 Stat. 224 (1823), however, the Seminoles
relinquished "all claim or title which they may have to the whole territory of Florida" in exchange
for a reservation in Florida. Later, in the Treaty of Payne's Landing, May 9, 1832, United StatesSeminoles, 7 Stat. 368 (1832), they consented, albeit under duress, to relinquish their reservation
and relocate to the Indian Country (now Oklahoma). In Seminole Indians v. United States, 23 Ind.
Cl. Comm. 108, 134 (1970), the Commission ultimately awarded more than $12,000,000 for these
takings of Seminole land.
117. Osceola v. Kuykendall, No. 76-492, slip op. at 8-10 (D.D.C. March I1, 1977).
118. 158 Ct. Cl. 672 (1962), on remand, 16 Ind. Cl. Comm. 536 (1966).
119. Treaty Between the United States and the Yakima Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855, art. 1,
12 Stat. 951 (1859). See Yakima Tribe, 158 Ct. Cl. at 675.
120. 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. 443 (1953).
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held against the Tribe on the merits as to one tract, and held in its favor as to
part of a second.'l As to the other two, Tracts B and D, both located along the
western border of the reservation, the ICC held that the Supreme Court decision
in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States'22 barred the Tribe from re-litigating
the correct location of the western boundary of the reservation. 23
' On appeal,
the Court of Claims reversed as to Tracts B and D, holding that the lack of
identity of the fact issues, and the lack of adversity of the present parties in the
original litigation, precluded application of res judicata, and it remanded for
consideration of the claim to these two tracts on the merits. 24 The ICC held
further hearings, and in 1966 ruled against the Tribe on its claim as to Tract B,
but in its favor on Tract D. That parcel, the ICC held, should have been included
in the reservation as surveyed.' 25
In 1968, the Tribe and the government entered into a stipulation, approved
by the ICC, under which 21,008.66 acres of Tract D (which embraced the peak
and eastern slope of Mount Adams) were placed in a separate sub-docket, which
would be held in abeyance while the Tribe sought restoration of the land to its
reservation. 2 6 The Tribe's effort was successful. On January 18, 1972, Attorney
General John Mitchell advised President Nixon, in a long and thoughtful opinion,
that the area in question had been intended to be included in the Yakima Reservation, but was mistakenly omitted. Despite the subsequent inclusion of the
land by President Roosevelt within the national forest, the Attorney General said,
the Tribe still held valid, unextinguished title to it. 21 7 Four months later, acting

in express reliance on that opinion, President Nixon ordered the 21,008.66 acres
to be removed from
the national forest and restored to the Yakimas as part of
28
their reservation.

1

There can be no doubt but that under the Tenth Circuit view of the ICCA,
the Yakimas would never have been allowed to stay their claim to the Mount
Adams tract to seek its return, but rather would have been forced to accept
compensation for it. And the Attorney General certainly would have advised the
President that the Tribe's pending ICCA claim"' was intended by Congress to
121. Id. at 477-59.
122. 227 U.S. 355 (1913). That case arose when the United States, responding to the complaints
of the Yakimas, determined that the original survey of the western boundary of the reservation had
located it some 20 miles or so east of the line described in the treaty ("the main ridge of [the
Cascade] mountains"). The government resurveyed the line so as to add nearly 300,000 acres to
the reservation, then sued to cancel patents that had been issued to the railroad within the omitted
lands. The Supreme Court affirmed that the new boundary correctly located the reservation line
established by the treaty, and, thus, the patents were void. See Yakima Tribe, 16 Ind. Cl. Comm.
at 540-46 (1966).
123. Yakima Tribe, 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 444-47.
124. Yakima Tribe, 158 Ct. Cl. at 680-82.
125. Yakima Tribe, 16 Ind. Cl. Comm. 536.
126. 20 Ind. Cl. Comm. 76, 89-93 (1968).
127. 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. 441 (1972). The opinion discusses at length, and rejects, the proposition
that Congress had implicitly ratified the deletion of these lands from the reservation.
128. Executive Order 11670, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1971-1975 Comp.) (May 20, 1972). The ICC subdocket to which the claim for these lands had been assigned was dismissed shortly after. 29 Ind.
Cl. Comm. 125 (1972).
129. The claim was cited and discussed in the opinion. 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. at 444-45.
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be the Tribe's exclusive remedy with respect to those lands, were that in fact
the case. Neither Mitchell's opinion, however, nor any of the ICC or Court of
Claims opinions in the Yakima case, even hint at such a proposition.
5. Implications From Post-ICCA Land Claims
In recent years several other Indian claims to federally controlled lands have
arisen outside of ICCA litigation. Their treatment, by Congress and the courts,
has likewise been utterly inconsistent with the Tenth Circuit's view that all such
claims were to have been concluded under the ICCA. The most notable such
claim, that of Alaskan natives to virtually all of the state of Alaska, was resolved
legislatively by Congress in 1968, in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA).' 3 That the aboriginal title of Alaskan natives to the lands they had
customarily used and occupied was unextinguished and unimpaired was regarded
as a given in the late 1960's, and was considered to be the principal obstacle to
construction of the Alaska Pipeline. ANCSA was enacted to effectuate an honorable settlement of the native claims, and to clear the way for the pipeline.' 3'
There is no suggestion anywhere in the legislative history of the Act that the
land claims of the Alaskan natives were to have been resolved under the ICCA.
Congress regarded those rights as sufficiently meritorious to warrant a settlement
of 40 million acres of land and nearly $1 billion in cash.' 32
Another case involving live Indian claims of title against the United States is
United States v. Dann.'33 Now in its fifteenth year of litigation, and on its third
trip to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the case illustrates as well as any can
the unfortunate complications visited upon Indians trying to hold onto their land
in the face of baseless stipulations of "takings" of those lands in ICCA cases.
The case does not, however, lend support to the Tenth Circuit view of the ICCA
as set forth in Navajo Tribe.
130. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-24 (1982). The Act affirmatively extinguished all aboriginal titles in
Alaska, including hunting and fishing rights. Id. at 1603.
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a); H.R. Rep. No. 92-523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1971
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2192,-2194.

132. Id. §§ 1605, 1611, 1613. Alaskan natives had been expressly included within the groups
entitled to file claims under the ICCA, as set forth in § 2 of that Act (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 70a (1976)).
Congress has also in the past 20 years enacted legislation restoring other federally controlled lands
to tribes claiming them under unextinguished aboriginal title. See, e.g., Act of December 15, 1970,
Pub. L. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (restoring Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo); Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub.
L. 95-498, 92 Stat. 1676 (restoring approximately 18,000 acres to Pueblo of Santa Ana); Act of
August 28, 1984, Pub. L. 98-408, 98 Stat. 1533 (restoring 11,000-acre religious site to Zuni Pueblo);
and see Act of July 9, 1984, Pub. L. 98-244, 98 Stat. 315 (restoring to Pueblo of Cochiti so-called
Ojo de Santa Cruz tract, on ground that recently discovered Spanish documents demonstrated Pueblo
had recognized title to tract under Spanish crown). Congress has furthermore acted on several
occasions to settle legislatively the land claims of various Eastern tribes, by obtaining land and other
benefits for them. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-16 (1982) (settling land claims of Narragansett
Tribe of Rhode Island); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-35 (1982) (settling land claims of Passamaquoddy Tribe
and Penobscot Nation of Maine). While these were not claims to federally controlled lands, their
resolution seems inconsistent with the contention that Congress intended the ICCA to liquidate any
extant tribal claims of title.
133. 470 U.S. 39 (1985), on remand, 13 Ind. L. Rep. (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 1986), appealsdocketed,
Nos. 86-2835, 86-2890 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1986).
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Dann began as a civil trespass suit that the United States brought against Mary
and Carrie Dann in 1974. 34 The Dann sisters are Western Shoshone Indians who
live in Crescent Valley, Nevada, on their family's ancestral lands.' For years
they have run a sizable herd of cows and horses under a claim of Western
Shoshone aboriginal title on several hundred thousand acres claimed by the
government to be public domain. 3'6 The government sought an injunction against
further unpermitted grazing by the Danns and damages for past trespasses. 37
The Danns moved for summary judgment on the title issue, but the district court
held they were collaterally estopped by the liability decision in the pending
Western Shoshone ICCA case 38 from asserting unextinguished title.' 39
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that there could be no estoppel against the
Danns on the title issue, because the parties in the ICCA case had stipulated,
not litigated, the issue of whether Western Shoshone aboriginal title had been
extinguished, and that in any event the ICCA litigation was not final. " The
court therefore remanded to the district court expressly "for the purpose of
deciding title." 4 ' On remand, the case sat inactive until the Western Shoshone
ICCA judgment became final. On April 25, 1980, the district court judge issued
a two-page order, holding that the finality of the ICCA case constituted an
extinguishment of Western Shoshone aboriginal title as of December 6, 1979,
and enjoining the Danns from unpermitted grazing thereafter. 42
' The Ninth Circuit
reversed again. '4 It held, after a detailed examination, that the United States
had never acted to extinguish Western Shoshone aboriginal title. '" The court
further ruled that the bar of Section 22 of the ICCA, 45 if it applied,'" had not
fallen, because the money awarded by the Commission in the Western Shoshone
claim had not been "paid" within the meaning of that section; it had merely
been deposited into a special account managed by the Secretary of the Interior,
pending adoption of a distribution plan. 4'
134. United States v. Dann, No. R-74-60 BRT (D. Nev., filed May 6, 1974).
135. Brief of Appellants at 3, United States v. Dann, Nos. 86-2835, 86-2890 (9th Cir., filed
October 27, 1986).
136. Id. at 3-5.
137. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985).
138. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, I I Ind. Cl. Comm. 387 (1962). The Commission had held
that Western Shoshone aboriginal title had been extinguished by the "gradual encroachment" of
settlers. See supra text accompanying note 113.
139. United States v. Dann, No. R-74-60-BRT (D. Nev., Feb. 22, 1977), rev'd, 572 F2d 222
(9th Cir. 1978).
140. United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978).
141. Id.at 223.
142. United States v. Dann, No. R-74-60-BRT (D. Nev., April 25, 1980), rev'd, 706 F2d 919
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 39 (1985).
143. United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 39 (1985).
144. 706 F.2d at 927-33. The court considered in turn each of the actions claimed by the government to have effected a taking, and found that none of them met the requirements of Santa Fe
Pacific.
145. See supra note 112.
146. The Danns also contended that they were not parties to or otherwise represented in the ICCA
case, and that in any event their defensive assertion of title was not a "claim" within the meaning
of § 22 of the Act. The Ninth Circuit did not address these arguments.
147. 706 F.2d at 926-27. The judgment fund, now amounting to close to $40 million with
accumulated interest, still has not been distributed to the Shoshones, due to the continuing demands
by the tribes for a land settlement.
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The United States did not challenge the court's holding that there had never
been any taking of Western Shoshone aboriginal title lands by the government.
It sought review in the Supreme Court only on the question whether "payment"
of the ICCA judgment had occurred within the meaning of Section 22 of the
Act."'48 The Supreme Court decided the narrow payment issue in favor of the
government. At the conclusion of the opinion, however, the Court noted that
the Danns had asserted both tribal and individual aboriginal rights, and that since
only tribal rights were at issue in the ICCA case, the claim of individual rights
was not barred." 9 The Court left the issue of individual aboriginal rights for
consideration on remand."5
The Court seemed to view its determination of the payment issue as foreclosing
5
any further assertions by the Danns based on tribal aboriginal title.' ' But the
Court indicated plainly that Indian rights of use and occupancy, such as were
found to exist in Cramer v. United States,'52 might nonetheless survive. This
position is directly at odds with the Tenth Circuit's view in Navajo Tribe, that
all Indian claims of title as against the United States were to have been concluded
under the ICCA. Indeed, at no time in the entire Dann litigation has it been
suggested that the Danns' aboriginal land rights, however characterized, could
not have survived the ICCA.
It would, moreover, be of more than passing interest if it turned out that, in
enacting a statute intended to remedy the old wrongs done to Indians, as the
ICCA expressly was,"' Congress decided to effect a few more wrongs, by
unilaterally extinguishing all unextinguished tribal titles to lands now claimed
by the United States. Indeed, the Navajos made that argument in Navajo Tribe:
to hold that claims such as the Tribe's claim to the E.O. 709 reservation could
be brought only under the ICCA effected a backhanded extinguishment of the
Tribe's title."M The Tenth Circuit's response is, in context, hard to fathom. The
court said that far from being a backhanded extinguishment, the Act gave tribes
an opportunity to litigate the validity of their titles, and to receive compensation
for them.' 55 Of course, for a tribe claiming it still owns certain lands, to be told
it has a valid title but that that title is now being liquidated for "fair compensation"
must look suspiciously like extinguishment. The court went on, however, to
148. Dann, 470 U.S. at 40-41.
149. Id. at 50.
150. Id. at 50. On remand, the district court found that the Danns retained treaty and aboriginal
grazing rights as extensive as those they had exercised on the day the ICCA judgment became final,
and exclusive aboriginal title to one section of land. United States v. Dann, No. R-74-60-BRT, (D.
Nev., Sept. 17, 1986), appeals docketed, Nos. 86-2835, 86-2890 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1986). Both
sides have appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
151. But see supra note 146. The arguments discussed there, of course, were not before the
Court.
152. 261 U.S. 219 (1923). In Cramer (which was cited by the Supreme Court in Dann, 470
U.S. at 50 n. 14, in the Court's discussion of the "individual aboriginal title" issue, see supra text
accompanying note 149), the Court held that a patent to public domain land occupied by an Indian
family would be cancelled to avoid interfering with the Indians' rights of use and occupancy. 261
U.S. at 233-34.
153. See Otoe and Missouria Tribes v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265, 131 Ct. Cl. 593, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955).
154. 809 F2d at 1469.
155. Id.
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explain that because the Navajos failed to bring their E.O. 709 claim to the
Indian Claims Commission, that claim was barred by the five-year limitation
period of Section 12 of the ICCA.' 56 The court then quoted a lengthy passage
from the Supreme Court decision in ChaseSecs. Corp. v. Donaldson,57
' in which
the Court set forth its view that statutes of limitations "go to matters of remedy,
' 58
not to destruction of fundamental rights.'
The implication of the Tenth Circuit's citation to Chase Securities is striking.
Just a few years ago, the Tenth Circuit itself had occasion to apply the Chase
Securities principle in a suit involving the Quiet Title Act, 5 9 United States v.
Gammache. " Gammache resided at the village of La Bajada, located within
the La Majada Grant in north central New Mexico, a Spanish land grant that
the government purchased in the 1930's. 6" Gammache had tried to quiet his title
against the government by a suit under the Quiet Title Act, but the suit was
deemed barred by that statute's twelve-year limitations period.' 62 The United
States then sued Gammache to quiet its title, reasoning (in part) that since
Gammache had lost his right to assert his title against the government, he no
longer had a defense to the government's assertion of title as against him. 63
1 The
district court agreed with that argument, ' but the Tenth Circuit reversed. Relying
on the principle articulated in Chase Securities, that statutes such as the Quiet
Title Act extinguish only remedies, not rights, the court held that Gammache
still could litigate the merits of his title claim in the government's suit against
him. 165
In Navajo Tribe, the court emphasized that it was holding only that the Tribe
was barred by the limitations period of the ICCA from bringing its claim of title
against the United States." Yet under the principle set out in the court's quote
from Chase Securities, and as applied in Gammache, it seems arguable that the
merits of the Tribe's claim of title remain unimpaired. The Tribe could thus
assert and litigate the title claim defensively should the United States (or anyone
else) ever find itself forced to sue the Tribe over rights to E.O. 709 land. Yet
that proposition, in turn, seems wholly inconsistent with the Tenth Circuit's view
156. Formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §70k (1976).
157. 325 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1945).
158. Id. at 314.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982). See supra note 54.
160. 713 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 594-95. (The court erroneously refers to the "La Bajada Grant".)
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g); see 713 F.2d at 589-90.
163. 713 F.2d at 590.
164. Id. at 590-91.
165. Id. at 591-94. The court further decided that the merits of the complex title question could
not be determined on summary judgment, and remanded the case for trial. Id.at 595.
In Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1983), the Supreme Court explicitly held that
the Quiet Title Act is not an adverse possession statute, and
does not purpose to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to a
disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to quiet his title remains
time-barred under § 2409a(f). A dismissal pursuant to § 2409a(f) does not quiet
title to the property in the United States. The title dispute remains unresolved.
Nothing prevents the claimant from continuing to assert his title ....
166. 809 F.2d at 1469-71.
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that the ICCA was intended as a device to conclude such title claims forever.
None of these considerations, admittedly, decisively refutes the Tenth Circuit's
view of the ICCA. It nevertheless seems odd that in all the Indian land litigation
under the ICCA and subsequently, there is not a single decision that tends to
support the Tenth Circuit's remarkable interpretation of the Act. Despite the
finality of the decision in Navajo Tribe and despite the fact that the bar of the
Quiet Title Act will, as a practical matter, probably preclude most tribal land
claims against the government anyway, the correctness of the Tenth Circuit
interpretation of the ICCA (in what appears to be the court's first encounter with
this forty-year-old legislation) must be regarded as, at best, highly doubtful.
6. The Indispensable Parties Issue
The second part of the Navajo Tribe opinion, affirming the dismissal of the
claims against the non-federal parties for lack of an indispensable party (the
United States), is also troubling. Fortunately, perhaps, the court began by noting
that the determination of indispensability "depends to a large degree on the
careful exercise of discretion by the district court" 167 and would only be reversed
for abuse of discretion. The finding of indispensability here, thus, should not be
seen as a directive to district courts in other cases. In light of the facts in Navajo
Tribe, moreover, the claim of unfairness in letting the Tribe litigate its case in
the absence of the United States has arguable merit. All of the events that gave
rise to the Tribe's claim of title were actions of the federal government, and the
success of its claim depended on establishing that two executive orders were
violative of an Act of Congress. " The non-federal defendants were innocent of
any wrongdoing as against the Tribe; moreover, the Tribe's pleading expressly
sought cancellation of their leases and patents," relief that has been held to be
70
unavailable except in a direct action by the United States.
of the factors govanalysis
own
opinion's
that
the
It must be said, however,
72
erning indispensability,' 7' its treatment of apparently contrary precedent, and
73
its disregard of congressional action that seemingly compels a different result,'
do warrant at least raised eyebrows.
The district court's reasoning on the indispensability issue, which the Tenth
Circuit adopted verbatim, 74 was that leases and patents issued by the United
States could not be cancelled unless the parties thereto were before the court.
167. Id. at 1471 (quoting Glenny v. American Metals Climax Inc., 494 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir.
1974)).
168. That is, that E.O. 1000 and E.O. 1284, see supra notes 35, 36, and accompanying text,
were void in that they restored unallotted lands to the public domain before all Navajos in the E.O.
709 addition to the Reservation had been allotted, contrary to § 25 of the Act of May 29, 1908, ch.
216, 35 Stat. 444, 457. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
169. Complaint at 13.
170. See, e.g., St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 647 (1882); Raypath v.
City of Anchorage, 544 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1976).
171. 809 F.2d at 1472-73.
172. Id. at 1473.
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982); and see infra text accompanying notes 193-206.
174. 809 F.2d at 1471-72.
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That rule is generally invoked as to leases,' 5 but plainly it cannot prevent title
litigation over patented lands, else no titles west of the original thirteen states
could ever be litigated. Virtually all private titles, especially in the western states,
are ultimately traceable to federal patents. If disputes over title to patented lands
could not occur without the presence of the United States, they would never be
resolved. 176

The notion that private title disputes must be litigable in the United States'
absence further serves to answer Judge McKay's principal point in his own
analysis of the factors underlying indispensability: that a decision in the Tribe's
favor against the non-federal parties "undoubtedly prejudices" the United States'
interests.' It is elemental that a party is not bound by a judgment rendered in
its absence.'78 That rule has been expressly applied to land suits brought by
Indians, to which the United States was not party.'79 The Tenth Circuit gave no
explanation why the principle was inapplicable in Navajo Tribe.
The Tribe had cited several cases involving Indian claims to land as against
non-federal parties, in which the government was explicitly held not to be indispensable.' The court distinguished those cases on the ground that in each
of them the United States' interests were aligned with those of the tribes, because
the government "was the putative fee owner of the trust lands in which the
Indians asserted beneficial ownership." '' In the case before it, the court explained, "[t]he Tribe and the United States are adversaries, each claiming sole
title to the same land. . . [they]
are not aligned together against the countervailing
82
interests of third parties.'
175. See, e.g., Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 903 (1976).
176. The cases cited supra note 170 are not to the contrary. Those decisions concern attacks on
the validity of the instruments themselves, for fraud, for example, or on the ground that necessary
prerequisites to issuance were not followed. No such claim was made in Navajo Tribe. Rather, the
Tribe's contention was, in effect, that since its title remained fully in force, the United States had
nothing to convey to third parties (although, to be sure, the Tribe had asserted its claim rather more
forcefully than the case called for, and did ask for cancellation of the patents; Complaint at 13).
177. 809 F.2d at 1472.
178. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Ch. 4 (1982). The general rule has,
of course, the usual exceptions, discussed in the cited authority, but none would seem to apply here.
179. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 371 (1968); United States v. Candelaria, 271
U.S. 432 (1926); Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, 193 F.2d 456, 459 (loth Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952). In Poafpybitty, the Supreme Court quoted approvingly a passage from
Choctaw & Chickasaw in which the Tenth Circuit had recognized "the rights of restricted Indians
and Indian tribes or pueblos to maintain actions with respect to their lands, although the United
States would not be bound by the judgment in such an action, to which it was not a party.
Poafpybitty, 390 U.S. at 371 (quoting Choctaw & Chickasaw, 193 F.2d at 459).
180. Choctaw & Chickasaw, 193 F.2d 456; Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983);
Puyallup Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R. I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976);
and see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 544-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1977),
affd, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Ft. Mojave
Tribe v. LaFollette, 478 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973) (reversing lower court's dismissal on ground of
United States' indispensability).
181. 809 F.2d at 1473.
182. Plainly, the Tenth Circuit cannot be saying that because the government sided with the Tribe
in each case, it was not indispensable. In Puyallup and Narragansett, the court nowhere mentions
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This attempt to distinguish the Navajo claim from the cited cases seems clearly
wrong. The Tribe was merely claiming "title" under an executive order, not a
deed. The United States, even under the Tribe's theory, would still retain the
underlying fee, but in trust for the Tribe.' 83 The case was, thus, in that respect
no different at all from Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, "8 Idaho v.
' Puyallup Tribe v. Portof Tacoma, 81 6 or NarragansettTribe v. Southern
Andrus, 85
Corp., 187 the decisions cited by the Tribe.
Dev.
I.
R.
The court's attempted distinction, moreover, misses altogether the reasoning
in the cited cases for finding the United States not indispensable. Each case
viewed the government's underlying interest in the land at issue (should the
Tribe's claim succeed), and the fact that the government would not be bound
188
by a judgment againstthe Tribe, as an argument in favor of indispensability,'
not against it, as the Tenth Circuit seems to suggest. Each court saw as far more
important, however, the interest in ensuring that Indian tribes have the ability
to vindicate their rights in their lands.' 89 The 1951 Tenth Circuit decision in
Choctaw & Chickasaw"'° remains one of the most frequently cited statements
of that principle. There, the court noted that the Supreme Court had on several
the attitude of the United States toward the litigation. In Andrus, the government had initiated the
suit, but then abandoned it on appeal, and in Choctaw & Chickasaw the government had refused
for 20 years to bring the suit for the Tribe, or to enter it when its joinder was attempted. 193 F.2d
at 457-58. Regardless, the subjective judgments of government officials toward tribal land litigation
cannot be determinative of indispensability under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
183. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 493.
184. 193 F.2d 456. There, the two tribes sought to quiet their joint title to 700 acres within their
reservation. The Tenth Circuit, in an often-quoted opinion, held that the suit could go forward without
the presence of the United States.
185. 720 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983). In this rather involved case, the United States had sued Idaho
to enforce a reverter clause in a conveyance of land that had been withdrawn from the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation for use as a state park. The Tribe intervened, alleging it had a reversionary interest in
the property. After the district court ruled in the state's favor, the United States and the Tribe
appealed, but the United States then dismissed its appeal. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Tribe's claim
of a reversionary interest, and held that it could prosecute the appeal on its own, despite the
government's abandonment of the suit.
186. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). The Tribe sued to quiet
its title to a 12-acre tract that had been part of the riverbed within the Tribe's reservation, but that
became dry land (and was developed by the Port of Tacoma) when the Corps of Engineers rechanneled the river. The court held that neither the United States nor the State of Washington were
indispensable (even though the state, under the "equal footing" doctrine, might itself have a claim
to ownership of the river bed; see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)) and it ruled in
the Tribe's favor on the merits.
187. 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976). One of the famous Eastern Indian land claims, this case
sought recovery of lands allegedly conveyed by the Tribe in violation of the Nonintercourse Act,
25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). The opinion cited contains the court's rulings striking state law affirmative
defenses, and holding that the United States was not indispensable to the maintenance of the suit.
The claim was ultimately resolved by Congress, generally favorably to the Tribe. 25 U.S.C. §§
1701-16 (1982).
188. E.g., Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1254; Choctaw & Chickasaw, 193 F.2d at 460-61; Narragansett,
418 F. Supp. at 811.
189. Cf. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (unique protections
afforded Indian title under federal law justify viewing Indian tribe's suit to recover land as one
"arising under" federal law, and thus within federal court jurisdiction).
190. 193 F.2d 456.
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occasions affirmed the capacity of restricted Indians and tribes to act on their
own to assert their rights in land. 9 ' Further, the court observed, to say that
Indians may sue to assert their titles to their lands "would be of no avail to them
if the United States is an indispensable party to such an action . . .""'
Congress essentially adopted the rationale of Choctaw & Chickasaw in 1966
when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which provides federal court jurisdiction for
any civil action by a federally recognized Indian tribe that "arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," without regard to jurisdictional amount. 93 Tribal claims to land were prominently mentioned, in both the
House and Senate Committee reports on the proposed Act, as the kinds of claims
for the prosecution of which Congress wanted to protect the tribes' access to
federal courts." 9 In particular the reports state Congress' desire to insure the
tribes could sue in federal courts "in those cases wherein the interest of the
Federal Government as guardian of the Indian tribes and as Federal sovereign
conflict, in which case the Attorney General will decline to bring the action.""'
It has long been settled that Congress has the power to regulate the practice
in federal courts, within the limits of constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction."
It is at least arguable that the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 amounted to a
congressional determination that Indian tribes are not to be denied access to
federal courts to assert rights to land solely as against non-federal parties, on
the ground that those assertions come into conflict with the interests of the United
States. Such a determination, it would seem, would necessarily overcome a nonconstitutional procedural doctrine, such as that of indispensable parties, grounded
191. See, e.g., Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629 (1943); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa
Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912).
192. 193 F.2d at 460. The court further noted the significant distinction, in this regard, between
actions by tribes to protect or regain land, and actions by others that would have the effect of
alienating Indian land. In the latter category of cases, the court pointed out, the United States is
invariably, and properly, deemed indispensable. Id. at 460. See Jackson v. Sims, 201 F.2d 259, 262
(10th Cir. 1953).
193. Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. 86-635, 80 Stat. 880. The section reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought
by any Indian Tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
194. See S. Rep. No. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) at 2, 3, 5; H.R. REP. No. 2040, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) at 2, 3, 5. Both reports contain a letter from Ramsey Clark, then Attorney
General of the United States, to the respective committee chairmen, saying:
Other suits which might be brought in the Federal Courts under the bill would
include actions to quiet title to land claimed by Indian tribes, including actions
to set aside patents where it is alleged the patents infringe upon rights claimed
by the tribes, under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States .
S. REP. No. 1507 at 5; H.R. REP. No. 2040 at 5.
195. S. REP. No. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) at 2. And see H.R. REP. No. 2040, 89th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) at 2 (bill provides jurisdiction "in those cases where the U.S. attorney
declines to bring an action and the tribe elects to bring the action").
196. Keary v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 89 (1842); Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I (1825).
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in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'" The same statute has been held to
override a federal statute barring injunctions against collection of state taxes, 28
U.S.C. § 1341,'98 in an action by a tribe to enjoin assessment and collection of
state taxes. In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,' the Supreme
Court held that Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1362, to ensure that an Indian
tribe would at least "in certain respects" have the same ability to sue to vindicate
2 °
its rights as the United States would have in a suit on the Tribe's behalf. " Thus,
suing to
from
1341
§
like the United States, the Tribe in Moe was not barred by
Oneida
in
principle,
that
Adopting
issue."
at
there
prevent collection of the taxes
22
Indian Nation v. State of New York, " the Second Circuit held that § 1362 abrogates state sovereign immunity in a suit by a tribe, since such immunity would
United States.20 3
not be available in defense of the same suit if brought by the 204
That ruling has since been followed by several district courts.
In light of those cases, it is difficult to understand how a tribe could be
prevented from pursuing a claim against non-federal parties on the ground that
the United States is unjoinable, if jurisdiction is otherwise proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362. The Navajo Tribe opinion unfortunately omits any mention of § 1362 at
all; but that opinion appears to be the only reported case, at least since that
197. Cf. Sioux Nation v. United States, 448 U.S. 371, 391-407 (1980) (Act of Congress waiving
defense of resjudicata, so as to enable tribe to re-litigate issue of whether Congress' expropriation
of the Black Hills was a Fifth Amendment taking, held not to violate separation of powers). FED.
R. Civ. P. 19 does, to be sure, have a long and distinguished ancestry in equity practice, see Mallow
v. Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193 (1827); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152 (1825);
7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1601 at 5-8, but it is described as a
discretionary doctrine, not one of constitutional dimension.
198. That section precludes federal district courts from enjoining the assessment or collection of
state taxes where state law provides an adequate remedy for challenges thereto. It has been held not
to bar such suits by the United States, however. Department of Employment v. United States, 385
U.S. 355 (1966).
199. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). The Tribes were challenging the applicability of Montana's cigarette
tax and vendor-licensing statutes to tribal members selling cigarettes within the Flathead Reservation,
and the applicability of state personal property taxes to motor vehicles owned by tribal members
residing on the Reservation. The Court found all of the taxes and the licensing act inapplicable,
with the important exception that it upheld the cigarette tax as applied to sales to non-Indians. See
also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
200. 425 U.S. at 476. The Court did not explain the reach of the quoted phrase, beyond the
immediate holding of the case.
201. See supra note 198.
202. 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982). In this case, the Oneidas lay claim to lands that they conveyed
away prior to the enactment of the Constitution. The claim recently was dismissed on the merits.
Oneida Indian Nation v. State of New York, 649 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. N.Y. 1986).
203. 691 F.2d at 1079-80.
204. Charrier v. Bell, 547 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. La. 1982) (following district court Oneida decision,
before it was affirmed by the Second Circuit); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297
(N.D.N.Y. 1983); Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin, 595 F. Supp. 1077 (W.D. Wise. 1984)
(holding abrogation of immunity extends to claims for money damages; cf. United States v. University
of N.M., 731 F.2d 703 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment no
defense to trespass damage suit by United States on behalf of Pueblo of Santa Ana against state
agency)).
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section became law, in which a tribe's suit against non-federal parties has been
dismissed because of the indispensability of the United States. In this era of
burgeoning Indian litigation to regain tribal lands,2"' the Tenth Circuit seems to
be swimming against the tide. 2°
B. Pueblo de Acoma v. New Mexico & Arizona Land Co.
Before leaving this topic, note should be taken of another Indian land case
decided by the same district judge who originally decided Navajo Tribe, just a
few months before that decision was affirmed on appeal. In Pueblo de Acoma
v. New Mexico andArizona Land Co.,207 the Pueblo asserted title to the mineral
rights underlying some 86,404 acres within its reservation. 0 8 Most of the land
in question had been patented by the United States to the Atlantic & Pacific
Railroad in 1908.2o9 The balance had been patented to the State of New Mexico,
at various times, pursuant to the New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910.2"0 By a
rather involved series of transactions, the surface of these lands was eventually
returned to the United States, in trust for the Pueblo, but the State and the Land
Company (successor in interest to the Atlantic & Pacific) retained the minerals. 2 '
The Pueblo claimed that these lands were within its aboriginal title area, that its
aboriginal title had never been extinguished, and that the patents to the Railroad
and the State were ineffective to overcome that title.21 2 Without reaching the
merits, the court held the Pueblo's claim to be barred by res judicata, by virtue
205. E.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Puyallup Indian
Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984);
Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981),
on remand, 528 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1982); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (ist Cir. 1975); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y.
1983), 667 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Schaghticoke Tribe v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp.
780 (D.Conn. 1976); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R. I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798
(D.R.I. 1976).
206. It must be said, too, that the court's failure to attempt to rationalize the two parts of the
opinion discussed in the text-the discussion of the dismissal as against the United States, and that
of the dismissal as against the non-federal parties-leaves additional doubt about the court's view
of the ICCA. If, as the court said, Congress intended that all extant tribal land claims would be
liquidated under the ICCA, it seems extremely unlikely that it would have limited the reach of that
remedy to lands under federal control, and left third parties open to title claims. Especially because,
according to the logic of the Tenth Circuit, the purpose of this scheme was to avoid disturbance of
subsequent titles, 809 F.2d at 1467, surely Congress would have intended to benefit third parties
whose titles derived from the United States. Yet the ICCA itself makes no provision for claims
against third parties, and the bar provision, § 22 (formerly codified as 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976)) runs
only in favor of the United States. Congress has, moreover, taken pains to preserve old damage
claims on behalf of tribes against third parties, 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1982), and the Supreme Court
has squarely held that, as to claims against non-federal parties, "[tlhere is no federal statute of
limitations governing federal common-law actions by Indians to enforce property rights." County
of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985). The inconsistent treatment accorded
lands patented to third parties, if the Tenth Circuit view of the ICCA were correct, begs explanation.
207. No. 82-1551-JB (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 1986).
208. Id. at 1-2.
209. Id. at 5.
210. Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557.
211. The chain of title, to the extent ascertainable by the court, is set out in the slip opinion at
4-12.
212. That contention, at least, is fully supported by the Supreme Court's decision in United States
ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
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of the final judgment in the Pueblo's claim under the ICCA, Pueblo de Acoma
v. United States.21 3 That was a claim in which the "taking" of the Pueblo's
aboriginal lands (of more than 1.5 million acres) was stipulated but never identified.214 In fact, there probably never was a taking; but the Pueblo accepted the
settlement amount, of more than $6 million, and thus the bar of § 22 of the
ICCA 2 5 had plainly fallen.
The Pueblo's principal argument was that the minerals were not covered by
the settlement of the ICCA claim, and the final judgment thus did not preclude
this assertion of title as to them.216 The court's opinion, however, cites substantial
evidence that although the minerals were not mentioned specifically in the stipulation that set out the basis of the settlement, that omission was an oversight
that was later caught; that although the stipulation itself was never amended, the
minerals were included in the rights to be compensated by the settlement; and
that even the Pueblo understood that it was being compensated for the minerals
as part of the settlement. 2'7 The court's conclusion that the ICCA judgment could
fairly be interpreted to cover the minerals at issue in this action appears to be
well-supported.
The one aspect of the decision that warrants further discussion is the brief
passage in which the court decided that the Land Company and the State both
are entitled to the benefit of the res judicatadefense because they are in privity
with the United States.21 s While it is, of course, true that res judicata applies
where the prior judgment involved the same parties or their privies,21 9 this rule
is limited, in the case of successors in interest to property. It has been held, by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, among others, that only where the transfer
of property occurred aftercommencement of the prior suit is the judgment against
the predecessor conclusive as to the successor.220 Here, the transfer to the Land
Company and the State occurred long before the Acoma ICCA case (and before
any "taking" of Acoma aboriginal title). To be sure, the correct analysis here
can depend on whether the ICCA judgment in the Acoma case is characterized
as being favorable or unfavorable to the United States,22' and requires consideration of the expanding circumstances under which the courts have justified
abandonment of the mutuality rule in the application of the doctrine of claim
preclusion.222 Those questions are beyond the scope of this article, other than to
note that they were presented by the district court decision in Acoma, but not
213. 18 Ind. Cl. Comm. 154 (1967), additionalfindings offact, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 219 (1970).
See Pueblo de Acoma v. New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co., No. 82-1551 JB (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 1986),
slip op. at 16-22; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
214. 213 Ind. Cl. Comm. 219 (1970).
215. Formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976). See supra note 112.
216. Pueblo deAcoma, slip op. at 2, 23.
217. Id.at 24-27.
218. Id. at 28.
219. Id.at 27; Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1983).
220. Wight v. Chandler, 264 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1959); Archer v. United States, 268 F.2d 687
(10th Cir. 1959); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Murray, 242 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1957); lB J.
W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §0.411[I] at 394; 18 WRIGHT,
4462.
MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
221. See IB J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §0.411[1] at
MOORE,

§

394-96.
222. See, e.g., 18
Supp.).

WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§

4463-65 (1987
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addressed.223 Given the utter absence of any litigation in the ICCA case of the
issue of whether a "taking" of Acoma land ever occurred, however, it would
seem that the Tribe may have had some good arguments against the invocation
of non-mutual preclusion.22
III. PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS: THE WATERS GET MUDDIER

A. The Background of New Mexico v. Aamodt
It has long been acknowledged that the nature and extent of the water rights
of Indian tribes on their reservations are governed by the seminal 1908 United
States Supreme Court decision, Winters v. United States.225 There, the Court held
that the setting aside by the United States of lands for the use and occupancy
of Indians carries, by implication, a reservation of sufficient water rights for the
present and future needs of the Indians .226 Because the "reserved rights" doctrine
(or "Winters" doctrine, as it is often called) depends on a "reservation" of lands
by the United States 227 for Indian occupancy, conceptually it is apparent that the
doctrine might not apply directly to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico. Elsewhere
in the United States, the government was deemed to take title to all the lands it
acquired, subject only to Indian rights of use and occupancy, rights that the
government could extinguish.228 In contrast, the core of Pueblo land holdings
consists of lands either granted to the Pueblos by the Spanish authorities, or
recognized under Spanish law as being their exclusive domain. 229 The United
223. In support of its holding that the Land Company and the State were entitled to invoke the
prior judgment, the court cited only the two recent Eighth Circuit Oglala decisions, see supra note
41, its own decision in Navajo Tribe v. United States, see supra text accompanying notes 21-224,
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(d) (1982). Pueblo de Acoma, slip op. at 28. None
of those authorities has a word to say about the rule of privity as applied to successors to property.
224. Cf. United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978) (stipulation in earlier ICCA claim
that aboriginal title had been extinguished held not to bar subsequent litigation of that issue, even
though Danns arguably were represented in earlier claim); followed, United States v. Dann, 706
F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 39 (1985). In Cayuga Indian Nation v.
Cuomo, 667 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), the court reasoned that since the ICCA was designed
only to address claims against the United States, a judgment under that act should not be viewed
as supplanting claims against other parties.
225. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The United States brought the case to enjoin Henry Winter and others
from damming and diverting water from the Milk River in Montana, on the ground that such dams
and diversions would impair the rights of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine tribes, then settled on
the Ft. Belknap Reservation (downstream from the defendants' dams and canals), who had a large
irrigation project underway. That reservation had been created by an agreement with the tribes ratified
by Congress on May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113.
226. See also, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597, 601 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S.
340 (1964) (holding that "practicably irrigable acreage" within the reservation is an appropriate
measure of the reserved fight). Perhaps the clearest statement of the reserved rights doctrine (which,
with certain qualifications, is now held to apply also to many other categories of land set aside by
the United States for particular purposes), is contained in Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,
138-39 (1976) (applying doctrine to protect water level in Devil's Hole National Monument from
being lowered by nearby groundwater pumping).
227. Or conceivably by the Indians themselves, from lands otherwise ceded to the United States.
See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
228. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Oneida Indian Nation v. County
of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).
229. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 485.
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States never had any legal interest whatever in these lands; upon confirmation
of the Pueblos' titles by Congress, titles to those lands were deemed fully vested
"
' Because
in the Pueblos, 2" although also subject to restrictions on alienation. 23
the efficacy of the Pueblos' titles depended in no way on federal action,232 there
arguably was no federal reservation of water rights appurtenant to those lands.233
The question of what water rights the Pueblos possessed, their nature, origin,
and extent, thus, has been very much up in the air.
In the late 1960's the New Mexico State Engineer initiated general stream
adjudications of five stream systems in northern New Mexico to determine the
water rights of seven northern Pueblos. 2" In the lead case, New Mexico ex rel.
Reynolds v. Aamodt,2 35 the district court decided in 1974 that Pueblo water rights
were subject to state law. On an interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that Pueblo rights are governed by federal, not state law.2 36 The court
230. See United States v. Maxwell Land Grant, 121 U.S. 325 (1887), on rehearing, 122 U.S.
365 (1887). Congress confirmed seventeen Pueblo grants (including that of the by then defunct
Pueblo of Pecos) by the Act of December 22, 1858, ch. 5, II Stat. 374. Of those, only 10 had
actual paper grants, nine of which were the so-called "Cruzate" grants issued in 1689. (Sandia
Pueblo had a grant issued in 1748.) The other seven Pueblos testified to the Surveyor General of
New Mexico that they had had grant documents from the Spanish authorities, but that they were
now lost. The Surveyor General and Congress accepted that testimony, and confirmed the grants.
231. By the Act of February 27, 1851, ch. 14, § 7, 9 Stat. 587, Congress expressly applied the
provisions of the Indian Non-intercourse Act (25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976); see supra note 58) to the
lands of the Indians in the territories acquired from Mexico under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
9 Stat. 922 (1848). That this statute actually applied to Pueblo lands, however, was not definitely
settled until 1926, by the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432
(1926). See infra note 252.
232. In Ainsa v. New Mexico and Arizona R.R. Co., 175 U.S. 76 (1899), the Supreme Court
held that perfected Spanish and Mexican grants in Arizona and New Mexico are fully valid and
effective regardless whether they are confirmed by Congress. To be sure, there have been numerous
additions to Pueblo landholdings, by executive and congressional action, and Winters rights presumably do attach to these lands. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010
(D.N.M. 1985) (holding that lands set aside for Nambe Pueblo by Executive Order on September
4, 1902, have Winters rights). Because most such additions occurred in this century, however, they
would carry priority dates junior to those of many non-Indian appropriators on the streams.
233. It was argued in the Aamodt litigation that the extension of the Nonintercourse Act to New
Mexico, see supra note 231, and the confirmation of the Pueblo grants by Congress, see supranote
230, conferred Winters-type rights on the Pueblos. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F2d 1102, 1109
(10th Cir. 1976). The court did not, however, accept that proposition. Such rights, in any event,
would have had little value unless they were given an ancient priority, because many of the streams
on which the Pueblos are located were already fully appropriated by the time of the American
annexation of New Mexico. See C. DUMARS, M. O'LEARY & A. UTrON, PUEBLO INDIAN WATER
Rtrarrs 42-54 (1984) (hereinafter, "DuMars").
234. New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), on remand, 618
F Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985), (Rio Nambe-Tesuque-Pojoaque; Pueblos of Tesuque, Nambe, Pojoaque, and San Ildefonso) (hereinafter Aamodt); New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aragon, No. 794 1C
(D.N.M., filed March 5, 1969) (Rio Chama; Pueblo of San Juan, Jicarilla Apache); New Mexico
ex rel. Reynolds v. Abeyta, Nos. 7896 and 7939C (D.N.M., filed Feb. 4, 1969) (Rio Pueblo de
Taos, Rio Lucero, Rio Hondo; Pueblo of Taos); New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abbott, Nos. 8499
and 9750C, (D.N.M., filed Mar. 22, 1968) (Rio Santa Cruz, Rio de Truchas; Pueblos of San Ildefonso,
San Juan, Santa Clara). All but Aamodt were held in abeyance until recently.
235. 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), on remand, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985).
236. 537 F2d at 1108-13. The court also reversed the district court's refusal to permit the Pueblos
to intervene through their own counsel, rather than be represented by the United States Attorney.
id. at 1106-1107.
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held that the Pueblos must, further, be accorded a priority earlier than that of
any non-Indian who obtained rights under the Pueblo Lands Act.237 As to the
appropriate measure of Pueblo rights, beyond suggesting that that might be
determined by examination of the law of Spain or Mexico, the court of appeals
confessed, "We do not know." 238 It remanded the case for determination of the
priority and quantity issues.
On remand, the district court appointed a Special Master,239 who conducted
lengthy trials on applicable Spanish and Mexican law, on the historical irrigation
of the Pueblos, on the irrigable acreage within Pueblo lands, and on the effect
on Pueblo water rights of the Pueblo Lands Act. 2' Thousands of pages of expert
reports were submitted by the United States, the Pueblos, the State Engineer
and the attorneys for the 1300 or so individual (non-Indian) defendants, and
testimony in the various trials consumed months of trial time. 24 ' The Special
Master issued several sets of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on different
issues. He found that Spanish and Mexican law accorded the Pueblos the first
right to all the water they required for their present and future needs.242 He also
found that Congress, by legislation enacted in 1933, had guaranteed the Pueblos
water rights for all the irrigable lands remaining in their ownership, with a
paramount priority.243 Such lands totalled 10,045 acres, he found, entitling the
four Pueblos to prior water rights amounting to 30,135 acre-feet/year. 2" The
state, of course, vigorously contested those findings.
B. The Aamodt Court's View of Pueblo Water Rights
Following its receipt of the Special Master's recommendations, and further
briefing by the parties, the district court issued its decision on the measure of
Pueblo rights on September 18, 1985.245 It rejected most of the Special Master's
Findings of Fact, but generally adopted his view of Spanish and Mexican law,
with a few significant changes. The final result was a new theory of the measure
of Pueblo water rights, one not proposed by any party to the case, and seemingly
contrary not only to the Tenth Circuit's prior decision, 2" but also to the governing
principles that the district court itself announced.
237. Id. at 1113. The court viewed that as the consequence of §9 of the Act of May 31, 1933,
ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108. See infra note 256.
238. Id.
239. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 53.
240. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331. 43 Stat.
636. The Act was supplemented by the Act of May
3, 1933, ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108. See infra note 257.
241. The complex issues in the case, and the evidence submitted on each, are discussed in
DuMARS, supra note 233, at11-80.
242. Special Master [sic] Amended Findings of Fact on the Rights of the Pueblos Under Spanish
and Mexican Law, filed August 20, 1984, at 4, 16-17.
243. Special Master [sic] Findings of Fact on the Pueblos [sic] Water Rights Measured by Irrigable
Lands, filed Sept. 13, 1982, at 3.
244. Id. at 3, 16. (This was the amount to be delivered to Pueblo land. The consumptive use
right was 23,907 acre-feet/year. Id. at 17.) He found further that the Pueblos were entitled to additional
rights, totalling 1001.6 acre-feetlyear, for livestock and domestic use and instream flows at Nambe
Falls. Id.
245. 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985).
246. 537 F.2d 1102.
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The court held that as recognized and protected under Spanish and Mexican
law, the water rights of the Pueblos "were defined as a prior and paramount
right to a sufficient quantity to meet their present and future needs." 247 Thus,
the court held, the four Pueblos "are entitled to a first right.., to enough water
'for their needs,' or the irrigation of their lands." 2 Under Spanish law, nonIndians were entitled to water only after Pueblo needs were satisfied, and, the
court said, this principle did not change under Mexican sovereignty.2 9 By the
terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 2" the court said, the United States
agreed to respect the property rights of all citizens of the ceded territory, including
"
(by implication) their rights to water.25
'
The court discussed the checkered treatment of the Pueblos under American
sovereignty,252 and cited reports of the Pueblo Lands Board253 in which the Board
stated that the Pueblos were entitled to "such water ... as may be necessary
for the lands now in cultivation or which may be necessary for the proper
cultivation by them
2 of such available lands as may be required for their support
and sustenance. , 5
The court determined that the rights the Pueblos held to their lands were
"aboriginal" water rights, meaning that they originated prior to European conquest of the territory, and were thus entitled to an "immemorial" priority. 5 It
247. Conclusion of Law No. 4, 618 F. Supp. at 998.
248. Conclusion of Law No. 18, 618 F. Supp. at 999. (The source of the words placed in quotes
by the court is not given.)
249. Id. at 1000.
250. 9 Stat. 922 (1848). The treaty ended the Mexican war, and accomplished the cession to the
United States of most of what is now the American Southwest, including New Mexico.
251. Id., art. VIII, 9 Stat. 929; see 618 F Supp. at 1001.
252. In United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1877), the Supreme Court held that the Pueblos,
being "peaceable, industrious, intelligent, honest and virtuous," id. at 616, were not "Indian tribes"
within the meaning of federal statutes protecting Indian land from trespass. Thirty-six years later,
in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), the Court reconsidered, in the face of evidence
that Congress had consistently continued to treat the Pueblos as it treated other Indians, and held
that the Pueblos were subject to the proscriptions of federal laws regulating the introduction of liquor
into Indian country. Joseph was expressly overruled by United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432
(1926), where the Court held that Pueblo land was subject to the same restrictions on alienation
applicable to other Indian land.
253. The Board was created by the Pueblo Lands Act, Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat.
636, to review the claims of non-Indians to see whether they met the criteria of §4 of that Act,
under which those who qualified could obtain titles to the Pueblo lands on which they had settled.
See infra note 257.
254. 618 F. Supp. at 1005 (quoting Pueblo Lands Board Report Under Section 6 for Tesuque
Pueblo, Ex. JP-32, at 5). Similar statements were made in the reports on the other three Pueblos
involved in Aamodt. Id.
255. Id. at 1005-09. The court's discussion focuses on judicial treatment of aboriginal land rights,
not water rights. The existence of true aboriginal water rights for irrigation has been endorsed by
the commentators, see, e.g., COHEN, supra note 3, at 590-91; DuMARS, supra note 233, at 11-25,
but has remained somewhat theoretical. But see, Soboba Band of Mission Indians v. United States,
37 Ind. Cl. Comm. 326, 348-52 (1976) (holding that the Band retained unextinguished aboriginal
water rights for a portion of its reservation); United States v. Adair, 723 F. 2d 1394, 1412-15 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984) (holding that
tribal water right for irrigation had priority as of date of reservation but rights for hunting, fishing
and gathering purposes were aboriginal, and had immemorial priority). The district court's conclusion
that Pueblo water rights are true aboriginal rights, however, plainly has the weight of historical
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further held that Congress, in Section 9 of the Act of May 31, 1933,256 confirmed
and recognized the priority of the Pueblos' rights.2"7
evidence behind it. There is no question but that all of the Pueblos engaged in irrigated agriculture
for hundreds of years prior to the coming of the Spaniards. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. at 996; DUMARS,
supra note 233, at 7. The characterization of the rights as "aboriginal," however, does no more
than establish for them paramount priority. There is no suggestion, in the district court opinion or
elsewhere, that the nature or measure of an aboriginal right is different from that of a reserved right.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order of February 26, 1987, ruling on various issues related to
Pueblo lands, the district court further ruled that water rights appurtenant to lands confirmed to a
Pueblo by Executive Order or by Act of Congress might also be entitled to aboriginal priority, if
those lands were within the Pueblo's aboriginal use area, and its aboriginal rights thereto had not
previously been extinguished. Id., slip op. at 7-8. The court reviewed the Pueblos' history under
American rule, and could find no act by which the United States had extinguished Pueblo aboriginal
titles, although it noted that the question whether such lands were subject to Pueblo aboriginal title
was a question of fact, yet to be determined.
256. Ch. 45, 48 Stat. 108 (1933). The Act was prompted by complaints that the compensation
awards by the Pueblo Lands Board for the lands the Pueblos lost under the Pueblo Lands Act, see
infra note 257, were below appraised fair market value. Section 9 of the Act reads:
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner be construed to deprive any of
the Pueblo Indians of a prior right to the use of water from streams running
through or bordering on their respective pueblos for domestic, stock-water, and
irrigation purposes for the lands remaining in Indian ownership, and such water
rights shall not be subject to loss by non-use or abandonment thereof as long as
title to said lands shall remain in the Indians. 48 Stat. at Il1.
257. 618 F. Supp. at 1009. This issue was one of the most hotly contested points in the case,
and the court's resolution of it in favor of the Pueblos would have made the decision a sweeping
Pueblo victory were it not for the court's highly restrictive ruling on the quantity of the Pueblo right.
See infra text accompanying note 259. Briefly stated, the problem arises out of the effort by Congress
to limit what the Pueblos lost under the Pueblo Lands Act, without rendering the land obtained by
the non-Indians worthless. The 1924 Act came about because, following the American accession to
sovereignty over New Mexico, the Pueblos were subjected to major encroachments on their lands
by non-Indians, which the United States was helpless to prevent after the Joseph decision. See supra
note 252. After Joseph was thoroughly discredited by the 1912 Sandoval case, see supra note 252,
the United States began to sue to eject the 12,000 or so non-Indians who had by then settled on
Pueblo land. Congress devised the Pueblo Lands Act as a means of providing good titles to those
settlers who had been in possession for so long that removing them seemed inequitable. The Pueblos
were to receive fair market value for the land they lost.
Nothing in the Pueblo Lands Act specified what water rights would be appurtenant to the lands
patented to non-Indians. The Pueblo Lands Board (the body created by the Act to investigate and
make initial determinations on the non-Indian claims, and to determine the compensation due to the
Pueblos) early on decided to award the Pueblos considerably less than fair market value for the
lands they lost, possibly on a theory (as the Board claimed long afterward to Congress) that the
non-Indians would not have water rights equivalent to those pertaining to the Pueblos' retained lands.
Pueblo complaints over the low compensation awards brought the matter back to Congress in 1932.
Congress understood that if the Pueblos kept a paramount priority for the water rights appurtenant
to the lands they retained, the inadequacy of the available water supply probably would result in
the non-Indians having no water rights of any value. In mid-Depression New Mexico, moreover,
loss of one's water rights was a virtual eviction notice. But if the non-Indians were held to have
received water rights bearing an early priority (i.e., one equivalent to that of the Pueblo lands),
there might be inadequate water for the Pueblos to irrigate other lands to replace those they lost.
This dilemma was especially acute for the four Pueblos involved in the Aamodt case, situated as
they are on small water-poor tributaries of the Rio Grande, but with large numbers of non-Indian
settlers in their midst, occupying much of the best farmland.
The record of Congress' often fiery
deliberations on this problem, as explained in DUMARS, supra note 233, at 61-80, does not reveal
any clear resolution. Congress enacted the 1933 Act, supra note 256, giving the Pueblos greater
compensation (thus arguably acknowledging the loss of valuable water rights), but containing the
language of § 9, supra note 256 (thus ensuring that the Pueblos had a paramount priority for the
water they needed to irrigate the lands they retained).
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The court further held that non-Indians who acquired land under the Pueblo
Lands Act did not acquire the Pueblo priority for water rights with that land.
Rather, the non-Indians obtained state law (appropriative) rights with a priority
as of the earliest non-Indian diversion for beneficial use. 258
Up to this point, the court's opinion is generally consistent with the Pueblos'
and the United States' arguments as to the nature and priority of the Pueblo
rights. But in one of the final passages of the opinion, without further explanation
or elaboration, the court stated,
[t]he Pueblos have the prior right to use all of the water of the stream system
necessary for their domestic uses and that necessary to irrigate their lands,
saving and excepting the land ownership and appurtenant water rights terminated by the operation of the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act, supra. The acreage
to which this priority applies is all acreageirrigatedby the Pueblos between

1846 and 1924. Acreage under irrigation in 1846 was protected by federal
law including the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra, and the 1851 Trade

and Intercourse Act, supra. The Pueblo aboriginal water right, as modified
by Spanish and Mexican law, included the right to irrigate new land in
response to need. Acreage brought under irrigation between 1846 and 1924
was thus also protected by federal law. The 1924 Act, which gave nonPueblos within the Pueblo four-square-leagues their first legal water rights,
also fixed
the measure of Pueblo water rights to acreage irrigatedas of that
25 9
date.

For the Pueblos, this holding snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. To say
that the Pueblos' rights are limited to that needed for the irrigation of lands
actually irrigatedduring any period, imposes restrictions otherwise unknown in
Indian water law. The court's position is more restrictive even than the position
the State of New Mexico had argued for in the Aamodt litigation. 2 As it happened, the period 1846-1924 was the period during which the vitality of Pueblo
irrigation, especially for the four tribes in the Aamodt case, reached its lowest
ebb. The lax attitude of the Mexican regime toward Indian land rights from 1821
'

258. 618 F. Supp. at 1010. This ruling follows the guidance of the earlier Tenth Circuit decision.
537 F.2d at 1112. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981), the Ninth Circuit held that a non-Indian successor in interest to an Indian
allotment acquired the allottee's ratable share of the reserved tribal water right, with the same priority
date as the (unallotted) tribal lands, i.e., the date the reservation was created. The non-Indian did
not, however, succeed to the Indian allottee's protection against non-use of the reserved right: if the
non-Indian failed to put the full right to use, with "reasonable diligence", 647 F.2d at 5 I, the unused
portion was lost. The different treatment accorded non-Indians inAamodt is presumably a consequence
of the fact that their occupancy began, not as the result of lawful consensual transactions, as in
Walton, but unlawfully, and was legitimized only by the grace of Congress. See Aamodt, 537 F.2d
at 1112. As explained infra at note 273, however, the Aamodt court's decision to penalize the nonIndians in this respect may be the factor that led it to impose an even more severe restriction on the
measure of Pueblo rights.
259. 618 F. Supp. at 1010 (emphasis added).
260. Earlier in the case, the state's position was that the Pueblos' rights were governed by the
law of prior appropriation, but without any forfeiture for non-use. See Brief for the Appellees at 1,
48, Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (No. 75-1106). Under that theory, the Pueblos were entitled to sufficient
water to irrigate all the lands they could prove they had ever irrigated, at any time in the past. The
Special Master had found that such lands totalled 8,428 acres, of which 3,821 acres remained in
Pueblo hands after the Pueblo Lands Act proceedings. Special Master Findings of Fact on The
Pueblos' Historically Irrigated Acreage, filed September 13, 1982, at 4.
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to 1846, and the apparent impotence of American authorities to help the Pueblos
protect their lands after 1846, subjected several Pueblos in this period to significant encroachments on their lands and to diversions of their water that had
near-catastrophic results.2 6' The expected effect of this aspect of the Aamodt
court's holding was realized in a subsequent opinion issued in the case on April
28, 1987262 (modified by order of September 9, 1987). The court found that,
under the theory it had adopted, the four Pueblos were entitled to water rights
sufficient to irrigate a total of only 1094.027 acres, 2 63 one-tenth of what the
Special Master had recommended.
From the Tenth Circuit's 1976 decision in the case until the judge's 1985
ruling, no party to this intensively litigated lawsuit ever proposed a measure of
Pueblo rights delimited in the manner that the court adopted. This fact, by itself,
should raise questions about the court's ruling. On its merits, moreover, the
ruling creates numerous unresolved issues. For example, the rights the Pueblos
enjoyed under Spain and Mexico, as found by the court, were rights to "a
sufficient quantity to meet their present and future needs. ,2 They were not fixed
'
rights; they "could be changed as needs changed." 265
Specifically, the court
found, "excess water should be granted to the Pueblos for their future expansion,
based on need." 2" The Tenth Circuit has previously held that the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo obliged the United States to protect property rights existing
in the territory at the time of the treaty, and that Congress' confirmation of the
Pueblos' titles to their lands2 67 validated the Pueblos' existing rights.2" The district
261. 618 F. Supp. at 1002; See Special Master Findings of Fact on the Pueblos' Historically
Irrigated Acreage, filed September 13, 1982, at 6-7.
262. Aamodt, No. 6639-M (D.N.M. April 29, 1987) (findings and conclusions regarding Pueblos'
historically irrigated acreage).
263. Aamodt, No. 6639 M at 12, 25, modified by Order entered on September 9, 1987. As noted
above, the Special Master had found the Pueblos entitled to water rights sufficient to irrigate 10,045
acres, and even under the state's historical irrigation approach, found that the Pueblos' rights extended
to 3,821 acres. See supra notes 243 and 244 and accompanying text & note 260. Because no party
had put on evidence of actual irrigation between 1848 and 1924, the factual record the court drew
upon to come up with acreage figures to fit its peculiar measure of the Pueblo right was ambiguous
and confusing. Compare Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the United States
and the Pueblos on the Quantity of Pueblo Water Rights Under the Court's September 18, 1985
Opinion, filed December 19, 1986, at 20 (presently owned grant lands to which court's theory
applies total 3,792 acres) with New Mexico's Requested Findings of Fact on the Quantity of the
Pueblos' Water Rights, filed February 27, 1987, at 9, 13, 14 (acreage Pueblos may have irrigated
during relevant period, depending on source, could be 1,094.02, 1,687.35, or 1,247.93). The court
seems to have adopted the lowest figure proposed by any party.
To be sure, the 1,094.027 acres is not the full measure of the water rights to be awarded the
Pueblos in Aamodt. The court has not determined the additional rights to be awarded with respect
to 597.40 acres of so-called "acquired" lands, see Memorandum Opinion and Order [Pueblo Lands]
entered Feb. 26, 1987, at 2, or with respect to lands reserved for Nambe and San Ildefonso Pueblos
by executive orders and Acts of Congress, see id. at 3.It appears that at least a substantial portion
of the "acquired" lands will also have an aboriginal priority, id. at 5, but will be subject to the same
quantity restriction imposed on other Pueblo grant land, i.e., actual irrigation between 1848 and
1924. Id.
264. Conclusion of Law No. 4, 618 F. Supp. at 998.
265. Id.
266. Conclusion of Law No. 18, Id. at 999.
267. Act of December 22, 1858, ch. 5, I1 Stat. 374; see supra note 230.
268. 537 F.2d at II11.
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court reiterated these points.269 But if, under the treaty and by subsequent confirmation of their titles, the Pueblo's pre-existing water rights were validated
and protected, it is difficult to see how such rights could be limited to actual
use after 1848, without the entitlement to expanded quantities based on future
need, an explicit aspect of the right as of 1848.27
Second, there is nothing whatever in the Pueblo Lands Act that expresses any
intent on Congress' part to determine Pueblo water rights as of the date of
enactment. A lively debate over the possible effect on Pueblo water rights of a
determination that valuable water rights went with the lands lost to non-Indians
27
under the 1924 Act preceded the passage of the 1933 Act. ' This, alone, should
utterly refute the proposition that the measure of Pueblo rights had been settled
nine years earlier by the 1924 Act. Congress' consideration of the 1924 Act,
moreover, was accompanied by unusually vigorous public debate, involving
several Indian advocacy groups that had arisen to take up the cause of Pueblo
land rights.272 Every aspect of the bill that might increase the loss of Pueblo
lands to the non-Indian settlers was intensely scrutinized; it is simply unthinkable
that Congress nevertheless enacted by implication an unannounced and unprecedented lid on Pueblo water rights.
The district court's theory that the Pueblo Lands Act determined Pueblo water
rights probably arises as a negative inference from the conclusion that the nonIndians who received titles to Pueblo lands under the Act also obtained valuable
water rights; i.e., if Pueblo rights were not fixed as of that date, there would be
no way to assure that the non-Indians, who held priorities junior to that of all
the Pueblo lands, would ever be entitled to water from these perennially watershort streams.273 If that were the district court's reasoning, however, one might
269. 618 F. Supp. at 1001.
270. Moreover, the non-Indian encroachments on Pueblo lands during the American period prevented the Pueblos from irrigating even to the extent of their needs, another strong reason why
determining their rights by actual irrigation during that period appears to lead to an inequitable result.
271. See DuMARS, supra note 233, at 72-80.
272. See L. KELLY, THE ASSAULT ON AsSIMILATION, JOHN COLLIER AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN
POLICY REFORM 213-94 (1983).
273. The value of a water right is determined by the two factors that have been discussed abovepriority and quantity. By according the Pueblos an immemorial priority, and giving each non-Indian
a priority only as of the date of the earliest non-Indian appropriation to beneficial use on his land,
the court was left with restrictions on the quantity of the Pueblo right as its only means of assuring
that the non-Indians on private claims acquired under the Pueblo Lands Act would have valuable
water rights. See supra note 257. It seems at least theoretically plausible that, if guaranteeing the
efficacy of the water rights appurtenant to the non-Indian private claims were deemed essential, a
result fairer to the Pueblos might be reached by allowing the private claims within the Pueblos to
tack onto the Pueblo's immemorial priority (for actually developed rights), and measuring the Pueblo
right by the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard recommended by the Special Master. The
Pueblos and the non-Indians on private claims within the Pueblo grants would thus have first claim
on the available water, and would share it ratably. Persons outside the Pueblo grants would share
whatever was left, in accordance with ordinary state law priorities. Such an approach would be
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Walton, see supra note 258, and likewise would have
historical support, in that virtually all the Pueblo lands settled by non-Indians and acquired by them
under the Pueblo Lands Act were lands that had long been under Pueblo ditches. It would also
simplify management of the ditches, on which Indians and non-Indians are interspersed.
To be sure, it is not at all certain that Congress, in the 1933 Act, see supra note 256, mandated
such consideration for the water rights of the non-Indians who acquired titles under the Pueblo Lands
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wish it had been explained. The water rights issue did not even come plainly to
the fore until Congress' consideration of the 1933 Act. Moreover, the legislative
history and the language of the Act leave some uncertainty as to how Congress
intended the issue to be resolved-if at all.27 Apart from its apparent decision
that Congress, in 1933, determined Pueblo water rights retroactively (or did so
silently in 1924), the district court gives no clue as to how or why it resolved
the question of Congress' intent as it did. Oddly, but for its immemorial priority,
the water fight the court found in the Pueblos looks very much like a state law
(appropriative) right, measured as it is by actual use, only during the American
period. That, too, seems at odds with what the Tenth Circuit had in mind in its
1976 decision.
In modem water rights litigation, Indians who, prior to being herded by the
government onto their reservations, never put a seed into the ground, have been
adjudicated relatively enormous Winters rights regardless whether they are ever
developed.275 It thus seems rather ironic that the Pueblos, whose entire cultural
history has been intimately linked to irrigated agriculture, are accorded highly
truncated water rights, restricted without regard to their future needs, dependent
on actual use and allegedly determined at a time when the Pueblos were unable
to irrigate freely.
The Pueblos tried to take an interlocutory appeal from the 1985 decision
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), but the court of appeals did not act on the
petition. A second petition for interlocutory review was filed by the Pueblos in
November, 1987. Finally on December 1, 1987, the court of appeals denied
both petitions. Numerous issues remain to be resolved in the case, 27 6 and a final
decree appealable as of right still seems years away. The Tenth Circuit will
eventually have occasion to consider the district court's unusual view of Pueblo
water fights, however. It will be interesting to see what it thinks.
IV. JURISDICTION CASES: THE SEARCH FOR "INDIAN COUNTRY,"
AND OTHER FUZZY CONCEPTS
Questions of jurisdiction have become the most vexing and persistent of all
of the knotty problems of Indian law. Whether it be the reach of state authority
Act, or that the Tenth Circuit's 1976 opinion permits any such major infringement of Pueblo rights
on the non-Indians' behalf. On its face, indeed, § 9 of the 1933 Act (set forth supra note 256) appears
to mandate that the Pueblos have prior rights for all the irrigable lands remaining in their ownership,
whether or not they had previously been irrigated.
274. DUMARS, supra, note 233, at 72-80; see supra note 257.
275. See, e.g., In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, State of Wyoming, 750 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1988) (holding Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes of
the Wind River Reservation entitled to reserved rights totalling approximately 477,000 acre-feet/
year).
276. On February 26, 1987, the court issued an opinion rejecting the assertion of immemorial
priorities for non-Indians, holding that non-Indian rights would relate back to the earliest acts
constituting appropriation to beneficial use on their lands, and ordering that non-Indian priorities
would be determined on a tract-by-tract basis, rather than ditch-by-ditch. Aamodt, No. 6639 (D.N.M.
Feb. 26, 1987) (opinion on priorities for non-Indian rights). On May I, 1987, the court set a schedule
for the parties' submissions on priorities and quantities for the Pueblos' so-called "acquired" and
reservation lands. Aamodt, No. 6639-M (D.N.M. May I, 1987) (opinion and order on further
proceedings concerning acquired and reservation lands). On January 1I, 1988, the parties filed a
"Stipulation Regarding Issues," in which they set forth their various views as to the matters remaining
to be dealt with by the court. The text of the Stipulation filled 20 pages.
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over Indians,277 the extent of tribal power over non-Indians,27 the power of states
"
' or federal282 courts, or
over non-Indians,279 the jurisdiction of tribal,28 ' state, 28
'
the jusimply the definition of the fundamental concept, "Indian country," 283
imbue
Indian
law
to
resolve
them,
the
"rules"
fashioned
issues,
and
risdictional
with all of the clarity and logic of the Tax Reform Act of t986.'

At least to

some extent, the ever-increasing complexity of this field must be attributed to
the Supreme Court's studied refusal to lay down clear rules,2 8' and its willingness
to modify, sometimes in seemingly arbitrary ways, those few rules that have
been established.25 6
277. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982) [commonly
known as "Public Law 280"1 did not, as had long been thought, allow certain states to assume full
regulatory jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, but only provided for assumption of state
court jurisdiction of crimes and civil causes of action arising in Indian country).
278. Compare Mermion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribes have full power to
tax severance of tribal minerals by non-Indians in Indian country) with Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (tribes' power to regulate non-Indians on fee land within Indian country
limited to activities directly affecting "the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
and welfare of the tribe").
279. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (state hunting and fishing
regulations pre-empted, even as applied to non-Indians, by comprehensive tribal regulatory scheme);
Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (state gross receipts tax
inapplicable to non-Indian contractor's receipts from construction of Indian school, due to pervasive
federal interest in Indian education).
280. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
suits by non-Indians against Indians in causes of action arising in Indian country, despite otherwise
transitory nature of claim).
281. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g Co., 467 U.S. 138 (1984), after remand, 106 S. Ct.
2305 (1986) (state may not preclude tribe from having access to state court for claim against nonIndian company arising from on-reservation construction project).
282. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987) (federal district court may not
exercise diversity jurisdiction over suit by out-of-state insurance company against Blackfeet Indian
for declaration of non-liability for injuries suffered by defendant in accident on Blackfeet Reservation,
until Blackfeet Tribal Court has had opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction of the case).
283. "Indian country" is a fundamental term of art in Indian law that describes the geographical
area within which the special jurisdictional rules apply. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 27-46.
284. Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
285. In Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), for example,
the court held that New Mexico gross receipts tax was inapplicable to the receipts of a non-Indian
contractor for the construction of the Ramah School on Indian trust land. The ruling was based on
a rather involved and somewhat mysterious preemption analysis that led the court to conclude that
the government's "comprehensive and pervasive" control over the construction and financing of
Indian schools left "no room for the additional burden" of the state's gross receipts taxes. Id. at
83943. Cf. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (comprehensive federal
control of timber sales on Indian land precluded application of state motor carrier and use fuel taxes
to non-Indian logging company doing business on the reservation). The United States had urged the
Court, in Ramah, to adopt a clear rule that state law is inapplicable to any Indian country activity
involving a tribal interest, but the Court declined the invitation, preferring an approach allowing
"more flexible consideration of the federal, state and tribal interests at issue," i.e., endless litigation.
458 U.S. at 846.
286. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Court noted that in Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), Justice Marshall had declared that within the Cherokee reservation
"the laws of Georgia can have no force," but that that clear rule had been modified over the years.
Williams announced the principle that, at least where the issue is the existence of state court
jurisdiction over cases involving Indians, "the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 358
U.S. at 220. To be sure, until Williams, that had never been the question in such cases. Thereafter,
however, state courts seized on that phrase, and used it to justify state jurisdiction unless there was
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Several recent New Mexico state court decisions that grapple with Indian law
jurisdictional problems give some idea of those complexities, although, with one
notable exception, the New Mexico courts seem to have made sincere efforts to
follow Supreme Court precedent. Four cases concerning state versus tribal court
jurisdiction are examined, after which we look at some important decisions
dealing with the "Indian country" concept.
A. Lonewolf v. Lonewolf
Lonewolf v. Lonewof,287 was an action for dissolution of the marriage of a
non-Indian woman to a member of Santa Clara Pueblo, who happened to be a
successful potter. Mrs. Lonewolf had originally filed a petition for a legal separation. Her husband answered, raising questions as to the state court's jurisdiction, but also counterclaimed for divorce.288 The parties had interests in real
property, as well as improvements on the property, within the Santa Clara Reservation, and personal property on and off the reservation. 9 The court entered
a decree dissolving the marriage, held it had no jurisdiction over the real property
interests, but assumed complete jurisdiction over, and divided, the community
personal property, including pottery worth $56,618 that was apparently situated
on the reservation.' Mr. Lonewolf appealed, challenging the court's jurisdiction
"
to divide the on-reservation personal property.29
'
The Supreme Court agreed that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
real property, but held that Mrs. Lonewolf's interest in the personal property
traveled with her. Having properly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Lonewolf and
her claim, the district court likewise had the power to divide the property.292
What unfortunately is missing from the Lonewolf opinion is any indication of
the residence of the parties, either during the marriage or after the separation.
It appears that Mrs. Lonewolf was living off the Reservation when she filed; her
husband may have lived at Santa Clara. If so, the court's rulings on jurisdiction
some obvious tribal governmental interest at stake. See, e.g., Chischilly v. GMAC, 96 N.M. 113,
628 P.2d 623 (198 1) (refusing to apply Navajo law governing repossession to repossession on Navajo
allotment outside reservation; see Hughes, supra note 2, at 410-41); State ex rel. Department of
Human Serv. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 803
(1983) (holding that state court has jurisdiction over paternity action involving on-reservation Indians;
see infra text accompanying notes 297-310. Those courts have overlooked the fact that in announcing
that principle in Williams, the Supreme Court was holding that there was no state court jurisdiction
over a suit against a Navajo Indian for a grocery debt incurred at an on-reservation trading post.
358 U.S. at 223. In context, the Court plainly was trying to protect the jurisdiction of tribal courts
over any claims arising in Indian country that involve Indians. But the fuzzy principle it articulated
does anything but make that interest clear.
287. 99 N.M. 300, 657 P.2d 627 (1982).
288. Id. at 301, 657 P.2d at 628.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. The court also held that Mr. Lonewolf, having counterclaimed for divorce and having
signed a stipulation dealing with other property, had waived his jurisdictional objection as to the
pottery. Id. at 302, 657 P.2d at 629. Besides being unnecessary to the holding, this point seems
wrong. The objection went to the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the pottery, a defense that
cannot be waived. Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974).
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seem correct. (If both resided on the reservation, the state court could have had
no jurisdiction over the matter.) 3 If, however, as seems possible, the couple
had lived at Santa Clara during happier times, before Mrs. Lonewolf moved
away, the question arises as to what her interest would be in the pottery under
Santa Clara Pueblo law, since that would probably have been the relevant
jurisdiction when they acquired the pottery. 2" If, hypothetically, the Pueblo's
law (customary or otherwise) gave a potter's spouse no interest in the potter's
art, and that law could be proven, the state court should be obliged to apply it
in determining the spouse's interest.295 To be sure, since Santa Clara, like other
Pueblos, does not recognize divorce, and has no separate court system2 it is
unclear whether the court could have answered these questions had the parties
raised them.
B. State ex rel. Department of Human Servs. v. Jojola
297
State ex rel. Department of Human Servs. v. Jojola, is not so defensible.
An Isleta Pueblo woman, residing at the Pueblo, gave birth out of wedlock, and
29 s
She identified Jojola, also
soon thereafter applied for state public assistance.
father, and assigned her
natural
as
the
Pueblo,
of
the
resident
and
a member
right to support from him to the State Department of Human Services (DHS) as
a condition of receiving assistance.' DHS sued Jojola in state court to establish
paternity of the child, and for child support. ° On Jojola's motion, the district
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed. The opinion runs roughshod over the few clear principles that do exist in the Indian law jurisdiction field, and ultimately rests on
the slender rationale that it "would be a burden on the aims of the public assistance
program" if DHS had to file such suits in tribal courts."
The opinion begins with the proposition that paternity is a transitory action
that may be brought wherever the putative father can be found. While true in
2
general, this point overlooks the holding in Williams v. Lee,' the leading case
on questions of state court versus tribal court jurisdiction over matters involving
Indians and upon which the Jojola court claimed to rely. Williams expressly held
that a suit for a grocery debt-plainly an otherwise transitory action-was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the tribal court, where the debt was incurred
293. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958); Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 561 P.2d 476 (1977).
294. See, e.g., Brenholdt v. Brenholdt, 94 N.M. 489, 612 P.2d 1300 (1980) (spousal interest in
property determined according to the law of the jurisdiction where it was acquired and situated).
295. Tribal power over the domestic relations of its members on the reservation has consistently
been regarded as extensive and exclusive. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976);
United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). And New Mexico courts are obliged to give full faith
and credit to tribal laws and other "public acts". Jim v. CIT Financial Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362,
533 P.2d 751 (1975).
296. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.22 (1978).
297. 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 803 (1983).
298. Id.at 501, 660 P.2d at 591.
299. Such assignments are permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982).
300. 99 N.M. at 501, 660 P.2d at 591.
301. Id. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
302. 358 U.S. 217 (1958). See supra note 286.
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by an Indian at an on-reservation store. 3 ' Under the Williams analysis, thus,
whether the action is otherwise transitory has no bearing on the issue of tribal
court jurisdiction.
The court noted, but ignored, Jojola's plainly correct and properly dispositive
assertion that the Pueblo "has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the domestic
relations of its members."' It then purported to analyze the principles set forth
in Williams, but discarded them one by one until it came to a passage from an
earlier New Mexico case 4" that suggested, as one factor to be considered in
applying Williams, "the nature of the interest to be protected." 3" The only
interest the Jojola court could ascertain was that of DHS in administering the
state's public assistance program, and it plainly viewed that interest as decisive.
Under a proper analysis of Williams, and the cases that establish the exclusivity
of tribal jurisdiction in matters affecting the domestic relations of tribal members,
this decision is unquestionably wrong. The defendant was a Pueblo member and
the cause of action for paternity and support arose on the Pueblo. 3° Those facts
alone suffice to bring the case within the exclusive tribal court jurisdiction rule
of Williams. The facts that the claim involved the domestic relations of members,
and affected issues of heirship and, possibly, tribal membership, make the jurisdictional argument overwhelming on legal and policy grounds. 3"
The inconvenience of DHS having to sue in tribal courts, moreover, turned
out to be considerably less than the New Mexico court believed. While Jojola's
appeal from the state supreme court decision was pending in the United States
Supreme Court, DHS simultaneously dismissed its state court case, filed the
paternity and support action in Isleta Pueblo Tribal Court, and issued a new
regulation specifying that such actions had to be filed in tribal courts in the
future, under appropriate circumstances. 3" DHS submitted the state court dismissal, the tribal court petition, and the new regulation to the Supreme Court
with its motion to dismiss Jojola's appeal, which the Court granted.3"' Although
not reversed, Jojola should not be regarded as sound.
303. 358 U.S. at 223.
304. 99 N.M. at 502, 660 P.2d at 592 (emphasis by the court). See supra note 295.
305. Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 561 P.2d 476 (1977). In that case, the court held that there
was no state court jurisdiction over a suit for forcible entry and detainer between two members of
the Mescalero Apache Tribe, involving property on the Apache Reservation.
306. 99 N.M. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
307. The court asserted that "the cause of action arose outside the reservation when [the mother]
filed and obtained public assistance and assigned her support rights to DHS." Id. But the suit against
Jojola was to establish him as the father of the child and his duty of support. The mother's application
for assistance was irrelevant to those claims, except that as part of the transaction she assigned her
claims to DHS. The assignment did not create any new claims; it merely transferred the mother's
existing claims to DHS.
308. Jojola has been criticized previously in Note, The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of New Mexico
District Courts Over Civil Cases Involving Indians, 15 N.M. L. REV. 75, 88-95 (1985). The author
of that note proposes an interesting if somewhat mechanistic approach to questions of court jurisdiction
in Indian country, that seeks to rationalize the New Mexico cases. Notably, the author appears to
proceed on the premise that each state is free to adopt its own jurisdictional doctrine in this area.
That, plainly, is incorrect. These are questions of federal common law; any deviations from the
"rules" established by the Supreme Court are in error. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo School Bd.
v.
Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982).
309. See Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, supra note 308, at 93 n. 125 and accompanying text.
310. 464 U.S. 803 (1983).
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C. In re Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act," ' an elaborate statute
designed to protect the interests of Indian tribes in their member children whose
custody or adoption might otherwise be determined by state courts. The Act
establishes a firm rule of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over custody determinations involving Indian children domiciled or residing on the reservation," 2
and a preference for tribal court jurisdiction over such actions involving nonresident, non-domiciliary Indian children.3" 3 In what may be the first reported
New Mexico decision coming within the terms of that Act,3 4 In re Adoption of
Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,3"' the court of appeals threw out a state
court adoption decree involving a child born of two Laguna Pueblo members,
both residing on the reservation." 6 The court of appeals held, as prescribed by
the Act, that Congress had mandated exclusive tribal court jurisdiction for such
an adoption.3"7 The case had a gnarled procedural history," 8 but the essential
facts left no room for argument that under the Indian Child Welfare Act the state
court was powerless to decree the child's adoption.

D. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Garcia
The fourth recent case on state versus tribal court jurisdiction, Foundation
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Garcia,3"9 raises issues that are anything but clear, and that
are complicated even more by a nearly simultaneous United States Supreme
Court case arising out of a similar fact situation.32 Foundation Reserve had
insured a car belonging to the Garcias, both Indians residing at San Juan Pueblo.32
The Garcias purchased the policy in Espanola, New Mexico, outside of the San
311. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1982).
312. Id. § 1911(a).
313. Id. § 1911(b).
314. In Jojola, the state supreme court knocked down its own straw man in concluding that,
because the Act by its terms did not cover mere paternity and support actions, it did not compel a
decision in favor of tribal court jurisdiction in that case. 99 N.M. at 502, 660 P.2d at 592.
315. 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
316. Id. at 736, 700 P.2d at 199.
317. Id. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
318. The Pueblo and the natural father had intervened in the district court adoption proceedings,
and when the court refused to dismiss the petition, they sought a writ of prohibition in the state
supreme court. That court denied the writ. The Pueblo and the father sought review of the denial
of the writ in the United States Supreme Court, which set the case for hearing on the merits. Pino
v. District Court of the Second Judicial Dist., 471 U.S. 1014 (1985). In the meantime, the district
court entered the adoption decree at a hearing at which neither the Pueblo nor the father was
represented. They subsequently sought relief under N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (now 1-060(B)), which
was denied. They then appealed to the court of appeals, which rendered a decision in their favor,
discussed in the text. Following the court of appeals decision, the appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was dismissed by the Court. 472 U.S. 1001 (1985).
In the court of appeals, the adoptive parents argued principally that the New Mexico Supreme
Court's denial of the writ of prohibition established the law of the case on the jurisdictional issue.
The court-disagreed, and noted that regardless, objections to subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time. 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
319. 105 N.M. 514, 734 P.2d 754 (1987).
320. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987).
321. 105 N.M. at 514, 734 P.2d at 754. Mr. Garcia is a member of San Juan Pueblo. His wife
is Cherokee. Id.
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Juan Pueblo Reservation. The policy excluded any coverage for losses sustained
while the vehicle was operated by Mr. Garcia. On March 30, 1985, the
3 22 Garcias
had an accident while in the car, within San Juan Pueblo boundaries.
Foundation filed suit in state court in San Miguel County, seeking a declaration
of non-liability under its policy.3 23 The Garcias challenged jurisdiction, arguing
that since they were Indians, and the accident occurred within the Pueblo's
boundaries, the case was one subject to exclusive tribal court jurisdiction.324 The
district court disagreed. It further found that Mr. Garcia had been driving and
ruled for Foundation on the merits. 3" The supreme court, through Justice Sosa,
affirmed.
The court rejected the Garcias' contention that the cause of action arose from
the accident within Indian country, distinguishing Hartley v. Baca.326 Rather, the
court said, this case arose from the making of the insurance contract, outside of
Indian country.3 27 It involved no issue of liability as among the parties to the
accident, but rather only Foundation's potential liability on its contract with the
Garcias.3 28 The court agreed that the tribal court of San Juan Pueblo would have
jurisdiction of the case, were it filed there, but held such jurisdiction to be
concurrent with, not exclusive of, the state court's jurisdiction.329
The court's reasoning seems sound. The interest protected by the Williams
rule, of extraordinary exclusive tribal court jurisdiction, is that of insuring that
the actions of tribal members within the tribe's jurisdiction are judged according
to their own laws and standards. Non-Indians who enter Indian country and
engage in transactions with or involving Indians there presumably are on notice
of that rule. That would dictate that issues relative to the liability of Mr. Garcia
vis-a-vis other persons involved in his accident can be determined only in tribal
court. The determination of whether an insurer has any liability to its insured as
a result of a particular event, however, is primarily a question of contract interpretation. Where the parties enter into a contract outside of Indian country, the
insurer arguably has a justifiable expectation that its insurance contract will be
interpreted by non-Indian courts.
A contrary argument could be made, however. Because the insurer had reason
to know that questions of its liability could arise in connection with occurrences
subject to exclusive tribal court jurisdiction, and because the determination of
the insurer's duty under the contract may require factual determinations that
322. Id. at 515, 734 P.2d at 755.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.The Garcias had also claimed lack of personal jurisdiction, but the opinion discloses no
defect in service on them, and there seems to be no other reason why the state court did not obtain
valid personal jurisdiction over them.
326. 97 N.M. 441, 640 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040
(1982). That case, a suit by a non-Indian against a Santa Clara Pueblo member for an accident that
occurred within the Santa Clara Reservation, affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. Justice Sosa in Foundation Reserve acknowledged the correctness of that decision. 105
N.M. at 515, 734 P.2d at 755.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 515-16, 734 P.2d at 755-56.
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would foreclose issues otherwise determinable exclusively by the tribal court
(e.g., who was driving the Garcias' car), exercise of state court jurisdiction could
be both unreasonable and an infringement on the jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
This is a close question, and one made immensely more complicated by a
United States Supreme Court decision issued less than a month prior to Foundation Reserve, but which the New Mexico Supreme Court did not mention.
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante,33 ° arose over a one-vehicle accident on the
Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, in which La Plante, a Blackfeet Indian employed on a ranch owned by another Blackfeet within the reservation, was
severely injured. La Plante sued his employer and the ranch's insurer, Iowa
Mutual, in Blackfeet Tribal Court, alleging bad faith refusal to settle on the part
of the insurer. Iowa Mutual asserted lack of coverage as a defense, and moved
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The tribal court held that it
had jurisdiction to decide La Plante's claim as to both parties, whereupon Iowa
Mutual filed suit in federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction, and asking for
a declaration of non-liability under the policy. La Plante moved to dismiss the
federal suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a motion the district court
granted."' The Ninth Circuit affirmed.332
The case before the Supreme Court, thus, was Iowa Mutual's suit for a
declaration of non-liability, the same type of case brought by Foundation Reserve,
and the issue was whether a federal court could entertain that case under its
diversity jurisdiction. The Court did not exactly answer that question, except to
say that the district court erred in dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Rather, the Court said, the district court should simply require Iowa Mutual to
330. 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). The facts stated in the text are found at 974-75.
331. The district court's analysis followed a line of decisions in the Ninth Circuit. It noted that
a federal court's jurisdiction in diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is dependent upon underlying
state court jurisdiction, relying on Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949). If no
state court would have jurisdiction of a case, then no federal court may entertain the case under
§ 1332. The Ninth Circuit, in R.J. Williams Co. v. Ft. Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th
Cir. 1983), Hot Oil Serv. Co. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966), and Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d
486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), applying this rule in the context of cases
arising in Indian country with Indian defendants, has held that if, under the rule of Williams v. Lee,
a case is exclusively within the jurisdiction of a tribal court, there can be no federal diversity
jurisdiction. That reasoning was applied by the district court in La Plante, which held that if the
tribal court had jurisdiction over La Plante's case, there could be no federal diversity jurisdiction
over Iowa Mutual's suit. The court required Iowa Mutual to allow the Blackfeet courts, including
the tribe's court of appeals, to finally determine their jurisdiction, before the case could proceed in
federal court. 107 S. Ct. at 975. (To be sure, tribal court jurisdiction over the claim against Iowa
Mutual might be only concurrent with, not exclusive of, state court jurisdiction, in which case the
rule against diversity jurisdiction might not apply.)
The Supreme Court discussed the district court's rationale in La Plante, 107 S. Ct. at 975, but
it is unclear what the Court thought of it, although the Court did suggest, 107 S. Ct. at 979 n. 13,
that because the lack of state court jurisdiction over the case was due to a federal, not state policy,
the Woods v. Interstate Realty doctrine might not bar diversity jurisdiction here. The holding of the
case, however, makes that observation somewhat academic. And in any event, the doctrine of
Williams, Hot Oil Service and Littell has probably been vitiated by the 1986 amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 1441, the federal removal statute. Congress added subparagraph (e), which permits a
federal court to hear a removed case even if the state court would not have had jurisdiction over it.
332. 774 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1985).
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exhaust its remedies in Blackfeet Tribal Court.33 3 If the Blackfeet courts hold
that they have jurisdiction, that determination is subject to review in federal
court, under the rule announced in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow
Tribe,3" but if the final outcome is a decision upholding tribal court jurisdiction,
the parties may not relitigate in the federal courts the merits of the tribal court
suit.335
The Supreme Court's opinion seemed largely swayed by the facts that La
Plante's tribal court suit had been filed first and that Iowa Mutual had raised its
non-liability defense in that case. 3" Still, the decision's failure to say anything
at all about the jurisdictional rules governing whether Iowa Mutual's suit was
subject to exclusive tribal court jurisdiction is bothersome. It may be that La
Plante's employer's insurance policy was contracted for within the Blackfeet
Reservation; if so, the case for exclusive tribal court jurisdiction would be a
strong one. If not, then the case is very much like Foundation Reserve.
Yet if the exhaustion rule the Supreme Court fashioned in Iowa Mutual applies
in federal diversity cases, even as a rule of comity, it is hard to understand why
it should not apply equally in state court cases (unless the policy being advanced
is merely to discourage federal diversity cases). The remarkable thing about the
Iowa Mutual rule, moreover, is its breadth: it essentially forces into tribal courts
every case that could be brought there, whether the court's jurisdiction would
be exclusive, under Williams v. Lee, or merely concurrent with the state court.
That is so, because tribal courts will virtually always have jurisdiction to hear
suits on transitory causes of action against resident tribal members, regardless
where the case arises. By requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies on demand,
and forcing exhaustive litigation of the jurisdiction questions before the merits
could be heard in other than tribal court, the Court essentially has compelled
any party planning to sue a reservation Indian to take his case to tribal court or
face the prospect of endless litigation.
To be sure, it is unlikely that many state courts will, on their own, require
similar exhaustion of tribal remedies before agreeing to hear the merits of suits
against Indians. Some may view Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union as
exercises of the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction over federal courts,
not as rulings of federal common law binding on states under the Supremacy
Clause.337 Whether the Supreme Court will extend this utterly novel rule to state
court proceedings remains to be seen. But in the meantime, tribal courts had
best gird themselves for an onslaught of new business.
333. 107 S. Ct. at 978.
334. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). That was a suit by the company to enjoin the Crow Tribal Court from
enforcing a default judgment against the company's insured, a local school district, in a personal
injury suit brought by a tribal member in tribal court. The Supreme Court held that such a suit,
asserting lack of jurisdiction in the tribal court, was a proper exercise of federal question jurisdiction,
but only after the tribal forum had been afforded a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.
335. 107 S. Ct. at 978. Of course, if the federal court decided there was no jurisdiction in the
tribal court to hear the action, it could then consider the merits under its diversity jurisdiction,
provided any of the parties were still alive at that point, and not bankrupted by the previous
proceedings.
336. Id. at 975 n.3, 977.
337. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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E. The "Indian Country" Cases
Several recent decisions in New Mexico have raised the question whether a
particular event occurred in "Indian country". All of the cases discussed but
one are criminal cases; in such cases the "Indian country" issue, alone, determines which jurisdiction's laws govern. State criminal laws, like other state
laws, generally do not apply to Indians within Indian country absent express
congressional authorization;33 rather, crimes by Indians within Indian country
are punished under applicable tribal or federal law,339 or possibly both.'

1. State v. Begay
State v. Begay34 1 was a prosecution of a Navajo for vehicular homicide, arising
out of an automobile accident in which two women and an unborn child, all
Indians, were killed. The parties stipulated that the accident occurred on "land
purchased by the United States Government and held in trust for the Navajo
Tribe", but outside the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation. 2 Begay moved
to dismiss the information for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and took an
interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals from the district court's denial of
that motion. 3
The court of appeals noted that the site of the accident fell within none of the
three categories of lands which constitute "Indian country" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 115 1. ' Without further information on the character of the lands in question,
338. COHEN, supra note 3, at 349.
339. In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), the Supreme Court expressly recognized the
exclusivity of tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed within Indian country by tribal members.
Various federal enactments, primarily the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-53, 3242
(1982), have brought certain categories of crimes by Indians within federal jurisdiction. The subtleties
and daunting complexities of this aspect of Indian country jurisdiction are thoroughly explored in
COHEN, supra note 3, at 286-304.
340. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). There, the Supreme Court held that a federal
prosecution of an Indian under the Major Crimes Act following a tribal prosecution for a lesser
included offense did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, inasmuch as the tribe and the United States were separate sovereigns.
341. 105 N.M. 498, 734 P.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1987).
342. Id. at 499, 734 P.2d at 279. That, unfortunately, was the only information in the record as
to where the accident occurred.
343. Id.
344. That section, part of the Indian Major Crimes Act, supra note 339, defines "Indian country",
for purposes of Major Crimes Act jurisdiction, as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978), observed that that
section, enacted by Congress in 1948, was intended as a codification of a line of Supreme Court
cases, including United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442 (1914), Donally v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), and United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913), in which the Court had gradually expanded the concept of Indian country to
include virtually all categories of land set aside for Indian use and occupancy and subject to federal
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the court was not prepared to determine the jurisdictional issue. 45 It therefore
remanded the case for further fact-finding on the status of the land where the
accident occurred, making clear that if the land is found to be Indian country,
there would be no state court jurisdiction.4
The court of appeals was probably justified in complaining about the lack of
detail in the record about the character and status of the land in question. It is
nonetheless arguable that the stipulated facts were sufficient to establish that the
accident occurred in Indian country, particularly in light of a Tenth Circuit
decision the Begay court seems to have misinterpreted, Cheyenne-Arapahoe
Tribes v. Oklahoma.47 That was a suit by the tribes to enjoin the state from
seeking to regulate hunting and fishing by tribal members on trust allotments
and lands, like the lands in Begay, purchased by the United States and held in
trust for the tribes.' The Tenth Circuit held that the land was all Indian country,
and that the state was without power to regulate.4 9 The Begay court regarded
the Cheyenne-Arapahoedecision as not determinative, however, because, it said,
the lands involved in that case "were located within the reservation." 35 The
court apparently missed the fact that, as the Tenth Circuit noted, the entire
Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation in Oklahoma had been disestablished by Congress in 189 1.3"'
Although the purchased lands were within the former reservation
boundaries, that was now irrelevant.
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Cheyenne-Arapahoe was, in part at least,
restrictions on alienation. Although by its terms, the statute
only applies tothe criminal jurisdiction
of federal courts under the Major Crimes Act, the Supreme Court has recently made clear that it
views the definition as applicable to questions of civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. California v.
Cabezon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1087 n.5 (1987); and see DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
345. 105 N.M. at 501, 734 P.2d at 281.
346. Id. at 501, 734 P.2d at 281. On remand, the district court ruled against Begay again. State
v. Begay, No. CR-86-6 (McKinley Co. Dist. Ct., August 31, 1987). Interlocutory review was denied,
but ifconvicted, Begay will presumably raise the jurisdictional issue anew on appeal.
347. 618 F2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980).
348. Id. at 667.
349. Id. at 669.
350. 105 N.M. at 501, 734 P.2d at 281.
351. 618 F.2d at 667. That was the ruling of an earlier case, Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250 (10th
Cir. 1965), to which the Tribes had not been party. But in Cheyenne-Arapaho the tribes expressly
did not contest that determination. 618 F.2d at 667.
Much more recently, the Tenth Circuit held that lands owned in fee by the Muscogee Creek Nation
(not the United States) in Oklahoma constitute Indian country for purposes of determining state
jurisdiction, wholly irrespective of whether the Creek Reservation had been disestablished (a point
argued by the state, but which the court did not decide). Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc., v. State of
Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 108 S. Ct. 2870 (1988). The court rejected
the assertion that a formal designation of Indian-owned land as a "reservation" was required to
make the area Indian country, so long as itcould be shown that the United States intended that the
area be set aside for Indian use and occupancy, under federal and tribal control. Although this holding
seems to go beyond the limits of United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938) (which held that
lands acquired by the United States in fee-not trust-for the Reno Indian colony were Indian
country, despite the lack of any formal "reservation" designation), it is a well-reasoned ruling that,
though perhaps confined in its effect to the unusual status of Indian lands in Oklahoma, appears to
be entirely consistent with the relevant Supreme Court precedents.
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influenced by the decision in United States v. John,352 in which the Supreme
Court observed that there was "no apparent reason" why lands purchased by
the United States for the Mississippi Choctaws "did not become a 'reservation,"'
as of the point when Congress declared them to be held in trust for the Choctaws. 53 The Begay court was also unpersuaded by that passage from John,
however. Because the Assistant Secretary of the Interior had formally proclaimed
the Choctaw lands to be a "reservation" in

19 4 4

,3" the Begay court, probably

correctly, regarded the Supreme Court's view of the status of the Choctaw land
prior to that time as dictum at best.3 55
It appears that the Begay case is destined to return to the court of appeals,
3
with a more fully fleshed-out record on the situs of the accident. " Properly
seen, Cheyenne-Arapahoeshould compel a determination that the accident giving
rise to the charges against Begay occurred in Indian country, and thus beyond
the jurisdiction of the state.
2. Blatchford v. Gonzales and Blatchford v. Winans
In Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico" 7 discussed at some length earlier in this
article,35 8 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Navajo claims of title
to the unallotted lands within the area added to the Navajo Reservation by
Executive Order 709 were barred. 59 But the court expressly left open the question
whether the reservation boundary addition had been legally disestablished, i.e.,
6
whether the entire area remained Indian country." The court speculated that the
36
"
jurisdictional issue might arise in a federal habeas corpus case, ' the context362in
in the past.
litigated
been
have
disputes
which several similar jurisdictional
underway
been
fact
in
had
a
case
such
While the Tenth Circuit speculated,
for some time. In July, 1978, Herbert Blatchford, a Navajo Indian, was convicted
in state district court in Gallup, New Mexico, of accessory to criminal sexual
penetration and kidnapping of a Navajo child, was sentenced to life imprison352. 437 U.S. 634 (1978). The Court held that lands set aside by the United States in the 1940s
for the Mississippi Choctaws (who stayed behind when the main body of Choctaws was removed
from their homeland in the 1830s to the Indian Territory) was, indeed, Indian country.
353. Id. at 649.
354. Id. at 646.
355. 105 N.M. at 500, 734 P.2d at 280.
356. See supra note 346. The hearing on remand established that the site of the accident, a road
south of Gallup, New Mexico, in the west half of Section 28, T. 13 N., R. 18 W., NMPM, was
purchased by the United States in 1967, in trust for the Navajo Tribe. State v. Begay, No. CR-866 (McKinley Co. Dist. Ct., Findings and Conclusions, August 27, 1987).
357. 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 21-226.
359. 809 F.2d at 1470-71.
360. Id. at 1474-76.
361. Id. at 1475 n.30.
362. E.g., Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), where the Court held that the opened
portion of the Colville Reservation in Washington remained Indian country; DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (consolidated with Erickson v. Feather, afederal habeas corpus
proceeding), where the Court held that the entire Lake Traverse Reservation in South Dakota had
been disestablished; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), where the Court held that the opened
portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota remained Indian country.
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ment, and was confined to the New Mexico State Hospital in Las Vegas. 363 The
crime occurred, for the most part, on privately owned land at Yah-ta-Hey, an
unincorporated community of stores and mobile homes that grew up at the
junction of U.S. Highway 666 and State Highway 264, about eight miles north
of Gallup, New Mexico, and seventeen miles east of Window Rock, Arizona. 3
Although just south of the recognized Navajo Reservation boundary, Yah-ta-Hey
is within the E.O. 709 addition, and has a predominately Indian population.365
Blatchford's conviction was affirmed on appeal, over arguments based solely
on trial errors. 3" Subsequently he filed a state habeas corpus proceeding in district
court in San Miguel County, claiming that the crime had occurred in Indian
country, and that the state courts thus had no jurisdiction over it.3 6' The district
judge agreed that the situs of the crime was in Indian country, and ordered him
released, but the state supreme court reversed.3 6' Although Blatchford's arguments were based on, among others, the continued vitality of E.O. 709,369 the
supreme court never mentioned that order. It discussed only Executive Order
No. 2513,370 a 1917 order by which President Wilson set aside some reacquired
railroad lands, that concededly did not include Yah-ta-Hey, for the Navajos. The
court determined that that order did not affect the status of Yah-ta-Hey, and
added-plainly incorrectly, but irrelevantly-that even if E.O. 2513 had encompassed Yah-ta-Hey, the community would nonetheless still not be Indian country
because Navajo aboriginal title to the particular section where the crime occurred
had been extinguished. 37' The court seemed to view the question whether Yahta-Hey could be deemed a "dependent Indian community," within the meaning
363. Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. 333, 334, 670 P.2d 944, 945 (1983), appeal dismissed,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
364. Blatchford v. Winans, No. 84-0384, slip op. at 18, (D. N.M. April 3, 1987), appealdocketed,
No. 87-1547 (10th Cir. April 20, 1987).
365. Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. at 335, 670 P.2d at 946 ("sixty to seventy percent of the
community is Indian"); Blatchford v. Winans, slip op. at 20 ("the area around the crossroads is
predominately rural Navajo").
366. State v. Blatchford, No. 12187 (N.M., March I, 1979).
367. Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. at 335, 670 P.2d at 946.
368. Blatchford v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944. Although the opinion primarily
addresses the Indian country issue, the court also held that the district court lacked any jurisdiction
to grant relief to Blatchford, as he had failed to exhaust his post-conviction remedies under former
Rule 57, N.M. R. CRIM. P. (now Rule 5-802). The court's extensive discussion of whether Yah-taHey is Indian country, thus, was merely "to afford guidance in further considerations of this matter
should Blatchford pursue other remedies." 100 N.M. at 335, 670 P.2d at 946. In Blatchford's federal
habeas case, the district court determined that, despite the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding,
Blatchford had in fact properly exhausted his state remedies. Blatchford v. Winans, slip op. at 3-8.
369. See supra notes 23, 34-37 and accompanying text. The federal district court expressly found
that Blatchford had argued E.O. 709 to the state district and supreme courts. Blatchford v. Winans,
slip op. at 5-6.
370. January 15, 1917.
371. 100 N.M. at 336, 670 P.2d at 947. The court was correct in holding Navajo aboriginal title
to have been extinguished. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl. Comm. 244, 248 (1970). See
supra note 27. But as the Tenth Circuit pointedly observed in Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809
F.2d at 1474-76 (and as numerous Supreme Court cases, such as those cited supra note 362, make
clear), within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, all land is Indian country, regardless of title.
18 U.S.C. § 115 1(a) (1982) codifies that important principle: "all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation . . . , notwithstanding the issuance of any patent .... .
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of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, likewise to depend on whether it was Indian-owned land
within a reservation.372
Blatchford subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus proceeding, on March
20, 1984, again asserting lack of jurisdiction in the state court. 73 After an eightday trial to the federal magistrate, the district court issued a decision on April
3, 1987, finding against Blatchford. 37'
Blatchford's arguments in the federal habeas proceeding differ in significant
respects from the Navajo Tribe's arguments in Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico.
Because it was claiming title to all of the unallotted lands within the E.O. 709
reservation, the Tribe was forced to contend that the two executive orders that
purported to restore the unallotted land to the public domain were invalid. 75
Blatchford made that point also, but it was not central to his case. He relied
primarily on the claim that the restoration of unallotted lands to the public domain
by E.O. 1000 and E.O. 1284 merely opened those lands to non-Indian settlement;
they did not annul the extension of the reservation boundary made by E.O. 709
and confirmed by Congress.376 Blatchford's principal claim thus threatens no
titles in the extension area; it goes only to the question of jurisdiction, and it is
thus very much like the five reservation "opening" cases decided by the Supreme
Court in the past twenty-five years.3 77 Blatchford also argued that Yah-ta-Hey is
a "dependent Indian community," within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 115 1.378
The district court concluded that the E.O. 709 addition to the reservation was
only temporary, and expired when the unallotted lands were fully restored to the
public domain. 79 In reaching that conclusion, however, the court acknowledged
that Congress' intent could not be clearly etermined from the history or language
of the 1908 ratification of E.O. 709.3' The court therefore looked to the "contemporaneous understanding" of what had occurred, as reflected in the mass of
historical documents placed in the record. 3 1' There, the court found support for
372. 100 N.M. at 338, 670 P.2d at 949. See infra text accompanying notes 383-423.
373. Blatchford v. Winans, slip op. at 2.
374. Blatchford v. Winans, No. 84-0384 HB (D.N.M. April 3, 1987), appeal docketed, No. 871547 (10th Cir. April 20, 1987).
375. See supra text accompanying note 38.
376. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, §25, 35 Stat. 444, 457. See supra text accompanying note
34.
377. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973);
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). In each case, the issue before the Court was
whether an Act of Congress that had designated all or a portion of an Indian reservation for issuance
of allotments to tribal members, after which the unallotted lands would be opened to entry and
settlement by non-Indians under the public land laws, had disestablished the reservation boundary
surrounding the "opened" portion. The Court found the "opened" portion no longer to be within
the reservation in DeCoteau and Rosebud, but found the reservation boundaries were unaffected by
the particular Acts in Seymour, Mattz, and Solem. And see, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087
(10th Cir. 1985) (on rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986) (holding opened portion
of Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Utah to be undiminished).
378. Blatchford v. Winans, slip op. at 2-3.
379. Id. at 10-17.
380. Id.at 10-13.
381. Id.at 13.
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the position that the reservation extension was not intended to outlast the land
withdrawal.382
Turning to the "dependent Indian community" question, the court determined
that the relevant community was Yah-ta-Hey "and the surrounding area within
a 3 to 5 mile radius of the crossroads". 8 3 It then considered several factors it
gleaned from cases that previously have dealt with the "dependent Indian community" concept. 3 These factors included the nature of the area (in terms of
land ownership and character of the population), the relationship of the inhabitants to established Indian tribes and the federal government, the practice of
government agencies in dealing with the community, whether the community
exhibits cohesiveness, and whether it has been set apart for the use, occupancy
or protection of Indians.3"5 The court observed that land ownership and population
in the Yah-ta-Hey community are predominately Indian, and that the Navajo
Tribe provides various services to community residents, but it gave greater weight
to the facts that the town simply grew up as a trading post area, had close
commercial, social and governmental ties to the town of Gallup, and had no
special relationship with the federal government.386 It thus held that Yah-ta-Hey
was not a dependent Indian community within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
Both of these issues are difficult ones, and the significance of the reservation
extension issue is potentially so broad that there seems little doubt that the loser
in the Tenth Circuit will seek Supreme Court review. Nor can one safely gauge
the merits of the competing positions on that issue, as this is another area of
Indian law in which the Supreme Court has not seemed able to fashion clear
general rules. In the earliest cases to consider similar questions, Seymour v.
Superintendent.7 and Mattz v. Arnett,388 the Supreme Court had little difficulty
concluding that Congress had not disestablished the Colville or Klamath River
Reservations, saying in Mattz that such a determination to terminate "must be
expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history." 389 That is consistent with the general rule of construction
382. Id. at 13-17.
383. Id. at 18.
384. Although the phrase, "dependent Indian community", was first used by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (in which the Pueblo Indians were held to be
subject to federal superintendence and protection, see supra note 252), and later in United States v.
McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938) (holding that the lands of the Reno Indian Colony were Indian
country), since that phrase was codified in 18 U.S.C. §.1151 (1982), see supra note 344, the Court
has not had occasion to interpret it. The principal decisions interpreting the statutory phrase are
United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (Ist Cir. 1982); United States v. State of South Dakota, 665
F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981); Weddell v. Meierheny, 636 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971); City of Sault St. Marie v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 157
(D.D.C. 1980); United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156 (D.S.D. 1979); and Youngbear v. Brewer,
415 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
385. Blatchford v. Winans, slip op. at 19.
386. Id. at 20-22.
387. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
388. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
389. Id. at 505.
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that Indian legislation must be interpreted, where possible, favorably to the
preservation of Indian rights, including tribal governmental power."
39
In DeCoteau v. District County Court, ' however, while adhering to the requirement of a "clear" expression of congressional intent to terminate a reservation, the Court found that intent in the broad language by which the SissetonWahpeton Tribe agreed to surrender its entire interest in its unallotted reservation
lands.392 On the strength of the agreement with the Tribe, the Court held that
in
Congress had intended to disestablish totally the Lake Traverse Reservation
39 3
South Dakota. Two years later, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, the court
found the requisite intent to diminish the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South
Dakota to less than one-third its former size in three acts of Congress passed
between 1904 and 1910, despite the Tribe's refusal to concur in the opening
legislation and despite similarities between at least two of the acts and the
legislation at issue in Seymour. Indian fears that DeCoteau and Rosebud presaged
a trend in favor of diminishment were alleviated by the decision in Solem v.
Bartlett,3 " which held that the opening of a portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation in South Dakota to non-Indian settlement did not diminish that
reservation's boundaries. The Court asserted in Solem that its prior decisions
"established a fairly clear analytical structure" for deciding which acts dimin395
ished boundaries and which did not. The primary elements of the analytical
structure were the principles that only Congress can diminish reservation boundaries, that diminishment "will not be lightly inferred", but that absent clear
language, the intent to diminish may be inferred from widely held contemporaneous understandings or, to a lesser extent, subsequent treatment of the affected
area by Congress and executive agencies."
As the Court suggested in Solem, however, Congress, in fashioning reservation-opening legislation in the early 1900's, rarely paid much attention to the
97
effect of particular acts on reservation boundaries. At that time, the notion
that tribes might retain jurisdiction over lands no longer in Indian ownership
was unfamiliar. In any event, virtually all members of Congress assumed that
398
the reservation system would soon be a thing of the past. To say, thus, that
requires indulg"intent"
congressional
of
determination
these decisions turn on
390. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (construing Indian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982), narrowly so as to preclude implication of waiver of tribal sovereignty
or creation of federal cause of action); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (construing
Public Law 280 narrowly so as to limit reach of state jurisdiction it permitted within Indian country).
See COHEN, supra note 3, at 221-25.
391. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
392. Id. at 444-47 (agreement by which the Tribes "'hereby cede, sell, relinquish and convey
all their claim, right, title and interest.
393. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
394. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
395. Id. at470.
396. Id. at 470-71.
397. Id. at 468.
398. Id.
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ence in a substantial fiction. Actually, the one factor that truly reconciles the
decisions in DeCoteau, Rosebud and Solem is the extent of present non-Indian
land ownership and population in the opened areas. 3 The Court seemed plainly
influenced in DeCoteau by the fact that Indians constituted only about nine percent
of the population and owned only fifteen percent of the land within the boundaries
of the Lake Traverse Reservation." Likewise, in Rosebud the land and population in the opened portions of the Rosebud Reservation were less than ten
percent Indian."' The facts in Solem, however, showed that half the population
in the opened area remained Indian. 2
It is difficult to conclude much from those cases as to congressional intent
with respect to the E.O. 709 addition to the Navajo Reservation. There are a
number of peculiarities in the Navajo case, further, whose possible effect on the
outcome is hard to assess. For example, in contrast to all of the cases discussed,
the "opened" area of the Navajo Reservation had not previously been part of
the reservation; it was added so that allotments could be issued to Navajos living
there. On the other hand, there is no explicit congressional act that diminishes
the E.O. 709 addition or empowers the President to do so, nor is there precedent
for the President having the power to change a reservation boundary confirmed
by Congress. Subsequent treatment of the addition, by Congress and the executive
branch, shows the same pattern of confusion and inconsistency noted by the
Court in Solem. 4 3 There is simply no clear theme.
But if demographic factors are as meaningful as the recent decisions suggest,
Blatchford may have a good chance for eventual reversal. The record in Blatchford v. Winans shows that fifty-five percent of the land in the E.O. 709 addition
is Indian-owned and another twenty-one percent is federal land used and administered by the Navajo Tribe. ' In addition, 90.1 percent of the population is
Indian."° The E.O. 709 addition today is, indeed, demographically much more
like an Indian reservation than most reservations elsewhere in the country.
The question whether Yah-ta-Hey should be deemed a "dependent Indian
community" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is similarly vexing, though not because of
inconsistent Supreme Court authority. There is no Supreme Court decision that
has interpreted that phrase in § 1151, although the phrase was derived from the
399. In Solem, the Court acknowledged that this "more pragmatic level" of analysis (i.e., how
many non-Indians now live in the opened area, and how much of the land they own) "is also relevant
to deciding whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation," id. at 471, in effect acknowledging
that it had recognized defacto diminishment even though the strict standards of de jure diminishment
might not have been met. Whether such mundane demographic considerations can work in favor of
a tribe, and not just against it, is a question possibly posed by Blatchford.
400. 420 U.S. at 428. Those facts were recited at the very beginning of Part I of the Court's
opinion.
401. 430 U.S. at 605.
402. 465 U.S. at 480. As the Court noted, roughly two-thirds of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe's members reside on the opened portion, and the seat of tribal government is situated there.
403. Id. at 478-79 ("so rife with contradictions and inconsistencies as to be of no help to either
side").
404. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 4, 5, 48.
405. Id. Probably a substantial portion of the non-Indian population, moreover, consists of doctors,
teachers, Bureau of Indian Affairs employees and others engaged in providing services to the Navajo
population. The record also contains uncontradicted evidence of the extensive services provided
throughout the area by the Navajo Tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (which maintains an Agency
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Court's decision in United States v. Sandoval.' There, in holding that the lands
of the New Mexico Pueblos are Indian country subject to federal jurisdiction
and protection, the Court referred in general terms to the "unbroken current of
judicial decisions" under which the United States exercises "a fostering care
and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders."a' On
its face, it appears the Court meant that phrase to describe broadly all communities
of "dependent" Indians, i.e., those still living in a tribal relationship and thus
subject to the federal trust responsibility. This broad characterization was necessary to bring within the sweep of federal protection the Pueblos, whose lands
are owned by them in fee, not by the United States in trust, and whose treatment
by the Court previously had been anomalous.' The use of the phrase "dependent
Indian community" by the recodifiers of the Indian Major Crimes Act, to identify
a category of geographical areas that should be deemed "Indian country," only
makes sense if it was intended as a broad catch-all term, as the Court used it in
Sandoval. The courts have not viewed the language in exactly that way, however.
Rather, courts have strained to develop from scratch various criteria for determining whether a particular community should be deemed a "dependent Indian
community," without any consistent concept of what the term was intended to
describe.
Some of the cases have been easy ones. In United States v. Levesque, the
First Circuit had little difficulty concluding that the Passamaquoddy Reservation,
coma state-administered Indian reservation in Maine, was a dependent Indian
'
munity, especially since the tribe had finally won federal recognition. Weddell
headquarters at Crownpoint in the addition). By comparison, state services there amount to relatively
little. Id. at 17-36.
Just prior to publication of this article, another decision from the New Mexico federal district
court held that the E.O. 709 reservation was not diminished by the subsequent restoration orders.
The case, Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Saunders, No. 86-1442 M (D.N.M. Aug. 22,
1988), was a challenge by the company to the Navajo Tribe's attempted taxation of certain of the
company's mining activities at its South McKinley Mine, which is situated within the E.O. 709
reservation boundaries near Window Rock, Arizona. The Tribe moved to dismiss for failure to
exhaust tribal remedies, citing Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union, see supra notes 330-36
and accompanying text. To decide that motion, the court felt that it had to determine whether the
South McKinley Mine was within Indian country (which happened to be the central issue raised by
Pittsburgh & Midway's complaint). The hearing on that issue ultimately lasted more than two weeks.
Pittsburgh & Midway, slip op. at 2.
The court's opinion on the motion to dismiss went carefully through the analytical steps prescribed
by Solem. It determined that neither the Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 25, 35 Stat. 444, 457,
see supra text accompanying note 34, nor Exec. Orders Nos. 1000 or 1284, see supra text accompanying notes 35-36, contain any language clearly revealing any intent to disestablish the reservation
boundaries. Pittsburgh & Midway, slip op. at 4-6. It further found nothing in the events surrounding
passage of the 1908 Act indicating any contemporary understanding that the reservation boundaries
would shrink, and subsequent treatment of the area by the government, the court said, was "inconclusive." Id. at 6-9. As for the demographic issue, the court reviewed the record, which was similar
to that made in Blatchford, see supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text, and found that the E.O.
709 area "has never lost its Navajo character." Pittsburgh & Midway, slip op. at II. It therefore
concluded that the E.O. 709 reservation boundaries have never been diminished, and the mine is
thus within Indian country. The Tribe's motion to dismiss was granted.
406. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 Historical and Revision Notes (West 1963).
407. 231 U.S. at 46.
408. See supra note 252.
Cir. 1982).
409. 681 F.2d 75 (ist
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v. Meierhenry,4" ° on the other hand, held that the city of Wagner, South Dakota,
in which ninety-five percent of the property was owned by non-Indians and
nearly eighty-four percent of the population was non-Indian, was not a dependent
Indian community.4 '
A somewhat harder case was presented in United States v. State of South
Dakota,4" 2 in which the Eighth Circuit held that a federally-funded tribal housing
project, on land acquired by the United States in trust for the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Tribe, within the city of Sisseton, South Dakota, was a dependent Indian community. The court rejected the state's argument that the city of Sisseton was the
relevant community, not the housing project, but only because the state had not
raised that argument in the district court."" Despite the obvious physical, economic, social and political nexus between the housing project and the town, the
court viewed the federal and tribal relationship to the housing project to be
determinative."'
The earliest reported decision to interpret the "dependent Indian community"
language, and still the only Tenth Circuit authority, is United States v. Martine."5
The court noted that there, the trial court received evidence on "the nature of
the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian
Tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice of government
agencies toward the area", which the Tenth Circuit viewed as "the proper approach." 4 6 The locale in question was the town of Ramah, New Mexico, a
largely Navajo community east and south of the reservation. The accident from
which the case arose occurred on land owned by the Tribe, but the opinion
appears to consider "the Ramah community" as the relevant community for
purposes of the jurisdictional inquiry.41 7 Without stating what facts it deemed
significant to the decision, the Tenth Circuit was satisfied that Ramah is a dependent Indian community.
These cases suggest that in deciding whether a particular community is a
"dependent Indian community" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the courts
have first looked at whether the relevant community is predominantly Indian,
and have then considered primarily the relative relationships of the community
to state versus tribal and federal governments. While land ownership has been
addressed in most cases, no decision (other than the New Mexico Supreme Court
decision in Blatchford v. Gonzales"') has held that the presence of non-Indian
410. 636 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1980).
411. Though situated within the boundaries of the original Yankton Sioux Reservation, Wagner
is in an area opened to non-Indian settlement. The South Dakota Supreme Court had twice held that
the opening statute diminished the reservation, and that issue was not contested in Weddell. Id. at
213 n.2.
412. 665 F2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
413. Id. at 841-42. Sisseton is within the former Lake Traverse Indian Reservation, which the
Supreme Court in Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), held had been disestablished by Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 391-92.
414. 665 F.2d at 842.
415. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1972).
416. Id.at 1023.
417. Id.
418. 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (1983), appeal dismissed,cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984);
see supra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
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9
land precludes a finding that a place is a dependent Indian community."
The district court decision in Blatchford was consistent with the foregoing
approach. The court ultimately seemed to place the greatest weight, however,
on the fact that Yah-ta-Hey had not been established or set aside by the federal
government, but merely grew up as a trading and residential area (albeit primarily
on Indian land).42 That focus seems to be in error. Had the community been
be deemed an
established or set aside for the use of Navajos, it would have to 42
"
"Indian reservation," and thus Indian country under § 1151(a). ' Were "dependent Indian communities" subject to the same test, there would be no difference between the two terms, and the second would be reduced to a simple
redundancy. The likelihood is that the codifiers included the second category
precisely to include those communities, like Yah-ta-Hey (and like the Pueblos),
that grow up without federal involvement or encouragement, and outside of
established reservation boundaries, but that primarily consist of Indians living
in the tribal relationship and subject to federal protection.
Martine lends strong support to that view. The town of Ramah was not established or set aside by the federal government for Indians. It was settled by
Mormons in the 1870s, as a ranching and farming community, near the homes
of a band of Navajos who had stopped there on their way back from the Bosque
Redondo.422 Stores and schools established by the Mormons undoubtedly began
to attract more Navajos over time, and the Ramah area today is a major community of about 2,000.423 But in terms of the factors deemed relevant to the
"dependent Indian community" inquiry, it differs hardly at all from Yah-ta-Hey.
If the Tenth Circuit finds itself unwilling to accept the continued vitality of the
E.O. 709 addition as an Indian reservation, it should have an interesting time
deciding whether Yah-ta-Hey (and by extension, a whole array of Navajo communities throughout this region, with names like Torreon, Lake Valley, Pueblo
Pintado, Churchrock, White Horse Lake, Borrego Pass, and many others) is a

-419. COHEN, supra note 3, at 39, explains that the phrase refers to "residential Indian communities
under Federal protection, not to types of land ownership or reservation boundaries." Because § 1151
was intended to reduce checkerboard jurisdictional situations, "patented parcels and rights-of-way
within dependent Indian communities should also be within Indian country." Id.
420. Blatchford v. Winans, slip op. at 20, 21-22. The record showed that 83% of the land within
three miles of the junction of U.S. Highway 666 and State Highway 264 is Indian-owned. Appellant's
Brief-in-Chief at 55.
421. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978), where the Court noted that the
concept of "Indian reservation" in the revised version of § 1151 was based in part on the decision
in United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938), where the Court had held that the Reno Indian
Colony constituted Indian country. The test applied in that case, in turn, the Court explained in
John, was drawn from United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914), and was "whether the land
in question 'had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence
of the Government,'" 437 U.S. at 645 (quoting Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449), and see McGowan, 302
U.S. at 539. (Pelican actually was concerned with whether an allotment within the opened-and
diminished--portion of the Colville Reservation in Washington remained Indian country, but the
passage quoted above was the Court's explanation of why the original reservation constituted Indian
country. In the Court's view, the allotments were of the same character, and thus retained the same
jurisdictional status.)
422. M.E. JENKINS AND A.H. SCHROEDER, A Brief History of New Mexico 70 (1974). See supra
text accompanying notes 25-29.
423. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 834 (1982).
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dependent Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Indeed, one could fashion
a persuasive argument that the entire E.O. 709 area, if not still a "reservation,"
is nonetheless a "dependent Indian community."
It might be noted that there is yet another case now pending in which the
jurisdictional issue posed by E.O. 709 is raised, though in quite a different
context. In 1984, the State of New Mexico filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, challenging final regulations issued by the
Secretary of the Interior concerning regulation of surface coal mining on Indian
lands, under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.424 The Navajo
Tribe intervened in the case opposing New Mexico, and counterclaimed for a
declaratory judgment that the E.O. 709 addition (which contains, among other
things, enormous coal reserves) constitutes "Indian lands" within the terms of
the Act, that are thus beyond New Mexico's regulatory jurisdiction. 25 After the
state settled its claim against the Secretary, the district court dismissed the Tribe's
counterclaim.426 On appeal, the court of appeals vacated the dismissal, but ordered the district court to transfer that counterclaim to the District Court for the
District of New Mexico. 421 The case currently is pending there. 25
3. State v. Ortiz
A final "Indian country" case that may turn out to have significant consequences is State v. Ortiz, 29 decided by the court of appeals at the end of 1986.
Ortiz, an Indian (although his tribal affiliation is not stated in the opinion), was
arrested for burglary and larceny, on private land or a public roadway in Espanola,
New Mexico, within the boundaries of San Juan Pueblo.43° His motion to dismiss
the charges for lack of jurisdiction was denied.43' On appeal, the court of appeals,
through Judge Minzner, reversed, holding that the crime occurred within Indian
country and was thus subject to tribal or federal jurisdiction.432
The court's opinion proceeded through a careful analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 1151
and the case law under it, and arrived at the conclusion that Pueblo grants ought
424. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). For purposes of the Act, "Indian lands" are defined as
"all lands ... within the boundaries of any Federal Indian Reservation ... and all lands
including
mineral interests held in trust for or supervised by an Indian tribe," 30 U.S.C. § 1291(9). Under
§ 1300, regulatory jurisdiction over Indian lands was to be determined only after a study by the
Secretary of the Interior. Interior published final regulations governing Indian lands on September
28, 1984, 30 C.F.R. Part 750 (1987). New Mexico's challenge was directed at the provision at
§ 750.6 (a)(I) that gave the federal Office of Surface Mining exclusive regulatory authority over
Indian lands. New Mexico had previously been regulating two large mines on the Navajo Reservation,
the Navajo Mine near the Four Corners Powerplant, and the Pittsburgh & Midway Mine east of
Window Rock, Arizona.
425. New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Minerals Dep't v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 820
F.2d 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 447.
428. No. 87-1108 1B (D.N.M., docketed August 28, 1987).
429. 105 N.M. 308, 731 P.2d 1352 (Ct. App. 1986).
430. Id. at 309, 731 P.2d at 1353.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 312, 731 P.2d at 1356.
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to be viewed as Indian Reservations under that section, and thus Indian country
'
"notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." 433
state or federal, dealing directly
decision,
reported
Ortiz appears to be the first
with the jurisdictional status of private lands within Pueblo grants. Although the
origin of these private titles (which the Ortiz court did not discuss) is quite
different from that of the private lands in "opened" reservations, such as those
at issue in Solem v. Bartlett, the history of the Pueblo lands makes an even
stronger argument for continued tribal jurisdiction. Those private titles all derive
from the Pueblo Lands Act, 4" which was enacted by Congress in 1924 to provide
a solution to the problem of non-Indian settlement on Pueblo lands in New
Mexico. That problem had arisen in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, when many people in New Mexico assumed that Pueblo lands were
not protected by federal law like other Indian lands, and thus could be freely
43
bought and sold or simply acquired by adverse possession. The Supreme Court
43 6
indirectly abetted such beliefs with its holding in United States v. Joseph that
the Pueblos were not Indian tribes within the meaning of federal laws restricting
alienation of tribal lands. Congress, however, continued to treat the Pueblos as
437
Indians, and in 1913, in United States v. Sandoval, the Court acknowledged
that the view it had espoused in Joseph was ill-informed, and that the Pueblos
were entitled to federal protection.
By the time of the Sandoval decision, there were an estimated 12,000 nonIndians who had settled on Pueblo lands, most under color of title, some as mere
squatters.438 Sandoval cast a dark cloud over their occupancy, and shortly after
that decision the United States Attorney for New Mexico began filing ejectment
actions against them.439 The resulting furor quickly reached Congress, and for
two years that body wrestled with the problem of reaching an equitable solution
to the situation, in the midst of what became a major national issue. Indian
advocacy groups from coast to coast became passionately involved in the debate,
as did Mabel Dodge Lujan and her coterie of artists and writers in Taos, Santa
Fe and New York."'
The scheme Congress crafted in the Pueblo Lands Act provided that those
non-Indians who met certain criteria-adverse possession since 1902 with color
of title, or since 1889 without color of title, plus (in either case) payment of
taxes-would be given valid titles to the lands they occupied."' The Pueblos
433. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a); 105 N.M. at 312, 731 P.2d at 1356.
434. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636. See supra note 257.
435. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 240 (1985).
436. 94 U.S. 614 (1877).
437. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
438. Mountain States, 472 U.S. at 243 n. 14.
439. Id. at243-44 n.15.
440. See generally, L. KELLY, supra note 272, at 213-93. The controversy over the Pueblo Lands
Act was what drew John Collier, then a New York social worker, into the Indian affairs arena. He
went on to become Commissioner of Indian Affairs under Franklin D. Roosevelt, from which position
he engineered several major pieces of progressive Indian legislation and helped foster a dramatic
swing in the pendulum of federal Indian policy in favor of tribal self-government. Id.; COHEN, supra
note 3, at 146-52.
441. Mountain States, 472 U.S. at 244.
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would receive compensation for the lands they lost." 2 All non-Indian grant
overlaps with Pueblo grants were to be confirmed to the Pueblos." 3 Congress
created the Pueblo Lands Board as an investigative body to review the settlers'
claims and make the initial determinations as to those that satisfied the criteria.'
Claims rejected by the Board would then be dealt with in quiet title suits filed
by the United States in federal court. '
The Pueblos lost more than 41,000 acres under the Act, much of it prime
irrigated farmland." 6 There is no reason to believe Congress intended they lose
more, however. The Pueblo Lands Act was an "act of grace" to the non-Indian
settlers, and as such must be strictly construed." 7 It was not, like the various
reservation "opening" statutes, seen as the first step in the gradual termination
of the reservation system; indeed, in § 17 of the Act, Congress declared firmly
that no "right title or interest" in any Pueblo lands, title to which had not been
extinguished in accordance with the provisions of the Act, could thereafter be
acquired by any person without the express authority of Congress.
This brief summary suggests that, as the Ortiz case concluded, the lands
patented to non-Indians under the terms of the Pueblo Lands Act should be
considered to be within the boundaries of Pueblo "Indian country," and thus
fully subject to applicable tribal and federal laws. Ortiz is an important, and
long overdue, jurisdictional ruling.
V. RELIGION CASES: OF EAGLES AND PEYOTE
Two recent cases decided by the United States District Court for the District
of New Mexico upheld claims of Indians that they were entitled, on the ground
of sincere religious belief, to engage in activities otherwise proscribed by law.
A. Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc.
Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc.,' was a claim by a Navajo Indian, Wilbur Toledo,
that Nobel-Sysco had unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his
religion when it refused to consider his application for employment as a truck
driver because of his membership in the Native American Church, the peyote
church. Peyote, a small cactus that grows in southern Texas and northern Mexico,
and one of whose principal components is the psychoactive alkaloid, mescaline,
has been used by southwestern Indians in ritualized settings since before the
arrival of the Spaniards." 9 Although now a so-called "Schedule I", or controlled,
442. Id. at 245.
443. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, § 14, 43 Stat. 636, 641.
444. Mountain States at 244-45.
445. Id. at 245.
446. Survey of Condition of Indians in the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., at 10914-10915 (1931). Nearly half
of the total was the entirety of the grant to the defunct Pueblo of Pecos, amounting to 18,814 acres.
Id.
447. Garcia v. United States, 43 F.2d 873, 878 (10th Cir. 1930).
448. 13 Ind. L. Rep. 3114 (D.N.M. April 2, 1986).
449. Id. at 3115.
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substance, peyote's use for religious purposes by the Native American Church
has been upheld by some courts."'
Nobel-Sysco, while not contesting the legality of Toledo's use of peyote,
claimed that the risk of his driving under the influence of the drug after a ceremony
"
justified its refusal to offer him a job.45
' The court rejected that contention, on
the grounds that Toledo claimed he only attended two to four ceremonies a year,
and that, as shown by expert testimony, one could safely drive approximately
twenty-four hours after ingestion of normal amounts of peyote.452 Nobel-Sysco
could therefore accommodate Toledo's religious beliefs, the court held, by allowing him to take one day off following a ceremony, a burden on the company
the court viewed as de minimis.453
B. United States v. Abeyta
The second decision was a federal criminal prosecution of an Isleta Pueblo
man for possession of a golden eagle carcass, under the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act.454 In United States v. Abeyta,4 5 the district court dismissed the
charges, on the ground that the Act did not apply to a taking of an eagle within
Pueblo lands, solely for religious purposes.
The opinion carefully documents the religious beliefs and practices of Isleta
to which the use of eagle feathers, from eagles taken in a particular manner
within Isleta aboriginal lands, is central.45 6 It was undisputed that Abeyta's sole
450. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). The
official listing of Schedule I substances, at 21 U.S.C. §812(c) (1982), and 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11
(1987), specifically exempts "the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the
Native American Church", 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1987). In Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 108 S. Ct. 1444 (1988), two Indian members of the Native American Church
contended that their religious beliefs were unconstitutionally burdened when they were denied
unemployment compensation after they had been discharged from their jobs as drug and alcohol
counselors because they had taken peyote at an NAC meeting. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed,
but the United States Supreme Court vacated the Oregon court's decision. The Court reasoned that
if the religious use of peyote was protected under Oregon state law (which otherwise made possession
of peyote a crime), the wrongfulness of the denial of benefits could be determined without reaching
the federal constitutional issue concerning peyote use, but that the Oregon court's decision had not
clearly addressed the legality of the use under Oregon law. The case was thus remanded to the
Oregon court for clarification of the state law issue. The Court indicated that if Oregon law did not
afford protection for religious use of peyote, the Court might have to determine whether such
protection could be found in the First Amendment, before it could decide whether the denial of
benefits was wrongful. The Court's premise is that conduct otherwise defined as criminal is not
necessarily protected just because it is claimed to be part of a religious ritual. In New Mexico,
however, the religious use of peyote has statutory protection. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-6(D) (1978).
451. 13 Ind. L. Rep. at 3116-17.
452. Id. at 3115.
453. Id. at 3116-17. Nobel-Sysco had offered to settle Toledo's claim prior to suit by proposing
that he give one week's notice of ceremonies, and that he take off the day after a ceremony. The
company also offered $500.00 in back pay. The court viewed that as a reasonable offer of accommodation, and thus denied Toledo's claim for damages.
454. 16 U.S.C. §668 (1982). The Act prohibits taking, possessing, selling, offering to sell, or
transporting any live or dead bald or golden eagle, or parts thereof.
455. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
456. Id. at 1303.
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purpose in taking the eagle was to use the feathers in the prescribed religious
ceremonies.
The Department of the Interior has established a means by which Indians
wishing to obtain eagle parts and carcasses for religious purposes may apply to
receive them from a federal depository in Boise, Idaho.457 Although Abeyta had
not tried to take advantage of that procedure,45 the court found that "it would
have not been fruitful for him to have done so," as, according to the evidence
heard by the court, the depository takes eighteen months to two years to fill
requests, and the application procedure is "unnecessarily intrusive and hostile
to religious privacy." 459 The court also found, on the basis of uncontradicted
testimony, that the golden eagle is not endangered, nor is its New Mexico
population in decline. A state Game and Fish biologist testified that some eagles
could be harvested in the state without an adverse impact on the population. 6
On those facts, the court held the Act to be inapplicable to Abeyta on two
separate grounds: first, that article IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo"'
guaranteed that the Pueblo Indians (and others residing within the Mexican
Cession) would be "secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction," and that there was no indication Congress intended to encroach upon that
treaty provision by enacting the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act; 46 2 and
second, that Abeyta's conduct was protected under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment, and the government had not established that its interest
in protecting the birds was sufficiently compelling to justify the Act's burden on
protected religious rights, or that no less burdensome means to achieve its ends
was available."s3 The court ended its opinion with the caution that it "in no way
declares an open season" on golden eagles, but merely holds that on the record
before it, Abeyta's taking of an eagle on Isleta land for religious purposes enjoyed
treaty and constitutional protection. ' The United States noticed an appeal, but
dismissed it prior to briefing.
These two decisions, especially Abeyta, reflect an unusual sensitivity to Indian
religious practices, and a willingness to accord them the same degree of protection
enjoyed by more conventional American religions, even where the Indian practices are of a type that might otherwise be frowned on by large segments of
457. See 50 C.F.R. Pt. 22 (1987). The regulations also authorize the Secretary to issue permits
to Indians to take eagles themselves for religious purposes. Id. § 33.33. The Abeyta court noted,
however, that although the Fish and Wildlife Service continues to issue permits to ranchers to take
depredating golden eagles, it has "never issued a permit to kill a golden eagle for Indian religious
purposes in New Mexico or anywhere else." 632 F. Supp. at 1304.
458. The court found that Isleta religious belief required that the feathers used in certain ceremonies
be from eagles taken on Isleta tribal land. Id. at 1303.
459. Id. at 1303-04. The applicant is required to identify the names of religious leaders and
groups and the ceremonies involved, among other things. Id. See 50 C.F.R. §22.22.
460. 632 F. Supp. at 1304.
461. 9 Stat. 922, 930 (1848). See supra note 250.
462. 632 F. Supp. at 1304-07.
463. Id. at 1307. The court noted in particular the evidence that golden eagles are not endangered,
and that the government was willing to permit killing of eagles by ranchers, for non-religious
purposes.
464. Id. at 1307-1308.
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society. Indian religious practices have not generally fared so well in the courts. 5
Toledo and Abeyta suggest that they will be taken seriously in the federal courts
in New Mexico. 66
VI. CONCLUSION
Nothing ever seems routine in Indian cases. And as the foregoing suggests,
cases arising in New Mexico continue to be as non-routine, as significant, and
as interesting in their complexity, as those in any other American jurisdiction.
465. Although the religious use of peyote has been upheld, see supra note 450, as has taking of
moose out of season for religious purposes, Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979), the
courts have gone to unusual lengths to frustrate Indian claims of Free Exercise rights of access to
and use of particular sites. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 956 (1983) (holding that Forest Service approval of major ski area expansion on San
Francisco Peaks did not give rise to impairment of religious practices of Navajos and Hopis, to
whose religions peaks were concededly indispensable, of constitutional dimension); Crow v. Gullett,
541 F.Supp. 785, (D.S.D. 1982), affid, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983) (rejecting Sioux claim that state development of tourist facilities at acknowledged sacred
butte violated Sioux Free Exercise rights); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (holding that ancestral sacred sites not sufficiently
"central" to traditional Cherokee religion to justify protection from flooding by Tellico Darn); Badoni
v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), affd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 954 (1981) (rejecting claim of Navajo medicine men that government should manage
Rainbow Bridge, a national monument, in such a way as to protect Navajo religious practices there,
on ground that to do so would violate Establishment Clause); cf. Dedman v. Hawaii Bd. of Land
& Natural Resources, 740 P.2d 28 (Haw. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988) (holding that
worship of volcano goddess Pele not impaired by proposed geothermal power project). Recently,
after a district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a proposed road and timber
sale would impermissibly violate the Free Exercise rights of Yurok Indians for whom the affected
mountain area had critical religious importance, the Supreme Court accepted review-the first time
it has taken such a case-and reversed. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,
565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affid, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), on rehearing, 795 F.2d
688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.
Ct. 1319 (1988). In a 5-3 decision, the Court held, in effect, that government land management
actions that do not actually prevent worshipers from having access to religious sites or that do not
otherwise coerce or penalize religious beliefs can never violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if
their effect were to "'virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion."' Id. at 1321
(quoting 795 F.2d at 693). This sweeping, and stunning, pronouncement may serve to put an end
to any further cases such as Badoni, Crow, Sequoyah, and Wilson, unless Congress enacts legislation
that would give sincere religious practices and beliefs the same protections from the acts of government land managers as are enjoyed by, for example, endangered species of plants and animals.
See, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1982).
466. In United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act did abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt eagles. The case concerned
eagle killings that were plainly for commercial, not religious, purposes. At the close of his opinion,
moreover, Justice Marshall carefully noted that the decision did not address the question whether
the Act invades religious freedom, citing Abeyta. Id. at 2224.
The District Court for Nevada declined to follow Abeyta in United States v. Thirty-Eight Golden
Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D.Nev. 1986), affid, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987), and held, apparently
on a much different record than was made in Abeyta, that to exempt Indians from the Act's requirements would unreasonably impair the government's interest in protecting this "rare and endangered
species." Id. at 277. Although the opinion proceeds on the premise that religious beliefs underlay
the killing of the eagles sought to be forfeited in this proceeding, there appeared to be evidence that
the claimant was actually selling the birds commercially. The Ninth Circuit affirmed without opinion.

